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THE PRODUCT LIABILITY OF THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY: HAS CIPOLLONE V. LIGGETT
GROUP FINALLY PIERCED THE CIGARETTE
MANUFACTURERS' AURA OF
INVINCIBILITY?
In 1979, the Surgeon General of the United States published
conclusive, scientific evidence establishing cigarette smoking as the
"largest preventable cause of death in America."' Smoking-induced
illnesses cause approximately 350,000 deaths in America each year 2
and cost the American economy between thirty-nine and sixty-five
billion dollars annually in health care costs and decreased produc-
tivity.' Cigarette manufacturers, however, publicly dispute that cig-
arette smoking is dangerous, 4 and have successfully avoided liability
for the harm smoking causes.
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL It (Secretary's Foreword) (1079) [hereinafter 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT]. The report states that: "In 1979, cigarette smoking is the single most important
preventable environmental factor contributing to illness, disability, and death in the United
States." Preface to 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT at vii. The 1979 report was supported
by over 30,000 articles on smoking and health. Id. at 1-5.
Edell, Cigarette. Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 93-94, (Fall 1986).
Edell notes that:
cigarette smoking [is] considered to be the major cause of lung cancer in the
United States; the major cause of coronary disease in the United States; the
major cause of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in the United States (90
percent); a cause of cancer of the oral cavity, pharynx, larynx, esophagus,
urinary bladder, pancreas, kidney .. , .
Id. (citing U.S. DEPT HEAL:FH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, (1979); U.S. DEi.'T HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, (1982); U.S. DEPT HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, TFIE HEAL:111 CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: CANCER AND CHRONIC LUNG DISEASE IN THE WORKPLACE, A REPORT O' THE
SURGEON GENERAL, (1985); U.S. DENT HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,
(1983); U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEAI:111 CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING: CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE LUNG DISEASE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, (1984)); see
also, K.M. McLeod, The Great American Smokeout: Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Liable For
Failing To Provide Adequate Warnings Of The Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C.L. REv. 1033, 1033
n.2 (1986); 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
3 Schultz, Perspectives on the Economic Magnitude of Cigarette Smoking, 85 N.Y, STATE J.
MED. 302, 302 (1985), see also Edell, supra note 2, at 94 ti.26.
a Ross, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco lndustty Toward a Smoke-Free Society?,
56 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 333 (1987). The author notes that the tobacco industry still disputes
the causal link between smoking and disease. Id. The chairman and chief executive officer
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Despite growing scientific evidence' on cigarette smoking's
harmful effects, the American judicial system has refused to impose
liability on the tobacco industry for the serious harm caused by the
consumption of their products.° A combination of favorable judicial
of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. testified before a congressional subcommittee that the smoking
and health controversy remains unresolved, and that the cigarette industry opposed the
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act because the medical and scientific assumptions or
findings underlying it were incorrect and unsubstantiated. Id. at 333 n.103 (citing Waxman,
The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 85 N.Y. STATE J. Men. 363, 364 (1985)). See also,
Janson, Cigarette Maker Assessed Damages In Smoker's Death, N .Y . Times, June 13, 1988, at R4,
col. 4. Janson quotes a 1972 confidential memorandum by a vice-president of the Tobacco
Institute (an organization created in 1958 by the tobacco industry to centralize their research,
public relations, and lobbying activities). The memo outlined the "brilliantly conceived and
executed" 20-year strategy of countering assertions that smoking causes cancer by "creating
doubt about the health charge without actually denying it." Janson, supra at B4, col. 4.
5 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 33
(1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. -111C 1964 report was supported by
approximately 6,000 scientific studies on the health effects of smoking. 1d. at 14. The report
concluded that smoking caused lung cancer in men and chronic bronchitis in both men and
women, but it failed to establish smoking as a cause of coronary heart disease or lung cancer
in women. Id. at 31-32. The 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, however, relying on over
30,000 studies on the health effects of smoking, established cigarette smoking as the single
"most important preventable factor" causing illness and death in the United States. 1979
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note I, at 5, vii. 'Mk report concluded that smoking was
a major cause of lung and other cancers in both men and women, and a risk factor for
cardiovascular disease. Id. at 1-16, 34-63. In 1983, the Surgeon General proclaimed that
cigarette smoking was the major cause of coronary heart disease in America. U.S. DEPT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF"THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE 127 (1983), [hereinafter 1983 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT]; see also Kepko, Products Liability -Can Il Kick the Smoking Habit, 19 AKRON
L. REV. 269, 269-70 (1985).
Tobacco suppliers have been held liable when their product has contained foreign
objects. See, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Cu. v, DeLape, 109 F.2d 598, 600, 602 (9th Cir.
1940) (affirmed judgment for plaintiff allowing recovery from cigarette manufacturer for
injuries sustained when a cigarette exploded while the plaintiff was smoking it); Pillars v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 497, 498, 500, 78 So. 365, 365-66 (1918) (tobacco
company liable for injuries sustained from the presence of a human toe in a package of
chewing tobacco); Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 469, 475-76, 241
N.Y.S. 233, 235, 241-42 (App. Term 1930), aff'd mem., 232 A. D. 833, 249 N.Y.S. 924 (1931)
(manufacturer held liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff due to the presence of
fragments of a dead mouse in a package of smoking tobacco); Comm v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 215, 217, 171 S.E. 78, 80, 81 (1933) (tobacco company held
liable for injury caused by the presence of a fishhook in package of chewing tobacco); Dow
Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 191, 202, 13 N.E.2d 130, 131, 135 (1936) (drug
store held liable for injury caused when cigar it sold to plaintiff' exploded while he was
smoking it).
No tobacco company, however, prior to the Cipollone verdict, has ever been found liable
or been required to pay damages for any injury caused by the consumption of the harmful,
but indigenous, components of tobacco smoke. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability:
A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. I,. Rev. 1423. 1425 (1980); McElvaine, Liability of Cigarette
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rulings, extreme inequalities in litigants' legal and financial re-
sources,' and societal attitudes toward smoking and smokers' "free-
dom of choice" have all contributed to this de facto immunity. This
judicially created immunity insulates cigarette manufacturers from
tort claims, contrary to the policy objectives of product liability law,"
and allows the tobacco industry to prosper. '" by marketing an ex-
tremely dangerous product with impunity."
Two 1988 cases, however, gave the impression that American
society may finally be prepared to hold the cigarette industry ac-
countable. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group the United States District
Manufacturers For Smoking Induced Illnesses and Deaths, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 165-66 (1986);
McLeod, Great American Smakeout, supra note 2 at 1033; see also, Janson, supra note 4, at A I,
col. 6; ("making his suit [Mr. Cipollone's] the first of more than 300 suits since 1954 in which
a tobacco company had lost even a single claim or paid a penny in damages").
7 Hell, supra note 2, at 91-92. Edell notes the disparities in the litigants' resources:
Although not usually articulated in the reported decisions, it is clear that the
many appeals and retrials placed extraordinary financial burdens on plaintiff's'
counsel, resulting in many voluntary dismissals. The only decision that actually
discusses the impact of the manner in which the cases had been defended is
the unpublished decision or Thayer v. Liggett & Myers. In that case, the judge
observed that "the facts themselves mock the mandatory jury instruction that
individuals and corporate institutions are always equal before the court." ID
fact, he was convinced "that the magnitude or the impact of the disparity in
resources between . . [the] parties through a sophisticated and calculated
exploitation of the situation by the defendant, approaches a denial of due
process which would compel the granting of a new trial. ThC question, unfor-
tunately, is now moot because plaintiff cannot afford further proceedings."
Id. See generally Trying the Tobacco Case: A Symposium of Interviews with Melvin Belli, J.D. Lee,
and Paul Monjione, 10 TRIAL Du.. J. 9 (Summe• 1987) [hereinafter Symposium, 'hying the
Tobacco Case].
8 See generally Gidmark, The Thbacco furies — An In-Depth Study, 10 'FRIA], DIP..[. 18
(Summer 1987); Janson, supra note 4, at Al, col.
W.P. KEETON, D. Dooms, R. 	 & I). OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIIIE LAW
1W Tincrs 692-93 (5th ed. 1984) thereinafter PaossEk]. The underlying theory of product
liability law is that the manufacturer is in a better position to bear the cost of any injuries
inflicted by its products because it Call insure against such risks and pass this additional cost
onto consumers by charging a higher price fur the product. Id.
'" Eichermald, Analysts See No Significant Setback for Tobacco Industry in Wake of Ruling,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1988, at 84, col. 1, Eichenwald noted that:
Last year, 50 million smokers spent about $33.3 billion on cigarettes in the
United States, more than ever before. Industry earnings hit a record of $3.45
billion in 1985, the last year for which industry figures were available. Profit
margins were higher than ever, reaching 13.8 percent, up from 9.2 percent a
decade before.
Id. at co1.6.
" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986) ("ln essence,
without any express authority from Congress, a single industry, for the first time in our
country's history, may speak what is untrue, may conceal what is true, and may avoid liability
for doing so merely by affixing certain mandated warnings to its products and advertising.").
11 503 F. Stipp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), later proceeding, 106 F.R.D. 573 (1).N.J. 1985),
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Court for the District of New Jersey upheld a $400,000 jury verdict
for a plaintiff whose wife contracted lung cancer from cigarette
smoking." This verdict marked the first time in the brief history of
tobacco product litigation that a jury imposed liability on a cigarette
manufacturer for injuries caused by the consumption of an una-
dulterated tobacco product. Additionally, the Minnesota State Court
of Appeals in Forster v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. held that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.' 4 does not preempt "failure-
to-warn" tort claims against cigarette manufacturers." This holding
marked a significant breakthrough in cigarette industry accounta-
bility because the cornerstone of the industry's tort immunity has
been the defense of implied preemption.' 6 These developments,
together with the increasing scientific knowledge concerning the
addictiveness of tobacco products, could end the era of de facto
immunity and expose the tobacco industry to a staggering amount
of litigation and liability.' 7 These apparent breakthroughs, however,
may be shortlived and largely illusory.
This note analyzes the current trends in tobacco product lia-
bility litigation, evaluates the prospects of future litigation, and
considers the legitimacy of the preemption defense. Section 1 ex-
amines the development of product liability law and its application
to cigarette manufacturers." This section discusses the rationales
and holdings of both the "first wave" and the "second wave" of
mandamus granted, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd in part and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1986), motion granted, 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986), motion denied, 802 F.2d 658 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 487, (1987), mandamus denied, 822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1987),
motion denied, 668 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987), motions granted in part and denied in part, No.
83.2864 slip op. 9936 (D.N.J. 1987), reconsideration denied, No. 83-2864 slip op. LEXIS 12659
(1987), motions granted. in part and denied in part, 683 F. Stipp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), motions
denied, 693 F. Supp 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
' 3 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210, 218-19 (D.N.J. 1988).
14 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-222,
84 Stitt. 87 (1970) at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982)). Congress amended certain provisions
of the Act by enacting the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) [hereinafter "the 1969 Act"], and again by enacting the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) [hereinafter "the 1984
Act"].
See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co„ 423 N.W.2d 691, 693, 701 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
See Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 675. The Cipollone court noted the irony of the preemption
defense: "[The Labeling Act] . . . which the tobacco industry sought so hard to defeat now
serves to substantially immunize it from liability • . • ." Id. See generally Ewell, Preemption of
Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued For Failure To Warn Even Though
They Have Complied With Federal Warning Requirement?, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 867 (1987).
17 Ewell, supra note 16, at 867-68.
'" See infra notes 22-395 and accompanying text.
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tobacco litigation to explore the evolution of the tobacco industry's
de facto immunity.' 9 Moreover, this section analyzes the Cipollone
and Forster decisions and the possible effects these two 1988 deci-
sions might have on the underpinnings of the cigarette industry's
de facto tort immunity. 20 Section II examines the legitimacy of the
preemption defense in cigarette litigation, and hypothesizes what
effect a reversal of the preemption finding might have on both the
tobacco industry and the American public. Section II also analyzes
how America's changing attitude toward smoking and the increas-
ing evidence on tobacco addiction may affect future tobacco product
litigation. This note concludes that holding the tobacco industry
liable for the harm their products cause would be an equitable way
to distribute the cost of such harm consistent with the objectives of
product liability law, and would directly contribute to the realization
of other societal goals. 21
I. AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION TO CIGARETTE LITIGATION
A. The Development of Product Liability Law in Modern Society
"Product liability" is the term used to identify the body of law
that seeks to hold manufacturers and sellers financially responsible
for their products' safety. The demise of the privity requirement 22
has allowed courts to expand the scope of product liability using a
hybrid of contract and tort law." Generally, as a matter of state
19
 Edell, supra note 2, at 90. Edell cites 1954 as the beginning of the "first wave" of
cigarette litigation. Id. at 90 11.1. The complaint in Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256
F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958), was filed on June 7, 1954. This "first wave" of cigarette litigation
ended in 1972 when the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted in Albright
v. R..). Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See Edell, supra note 2, at
90 n.2; Garner, supra note 6, at 1426. All of the "first wave" plaintiffs were unsuccessful in
their attempts to recover for their smoking-induced illnesses. Edell, supra note 2, at 90.
The "second wave" of cigarette litigation is the term used to describe the lawsuits brought
by smoker-plaintiff's during the 1980's. McElvaine, supra note 6, at 169. The first such lawsuit
to go to a jury was the unreported case Galbraith v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. See, Gidmark,
.supra note 8, at 18. The case resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant.
2" See infra notes 250-305 and accompanying text,
21 See infra notes 397-469 and accompanying text.
22 The privity requirement was established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842). Prosser, supra note 9, at 681. Winterbottorn held that a seller
had no liability, in contract or in tort, to anyone other than his or her immediate buyer.
23 Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1100 (1960). The author
notes that product liability is "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse or tort and
contract." Id. at 1126. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 325




 courts utilize both tort and contract theories of recovery to
impose liability on manufacturers and sellers for marketing "unrea-
sonably dangerous" products that injure the consuming public. 25
Contractually, recovery for product-related injuries may be
sought under a breach of warranty theory. In the vast majority of
states, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs
most aspects of commercial sales transactions, including the law of
sales warranties. 2" The UCC recognizes three distinct types of sales
warranties: an express warranty; 27 an implied warranty of mer-
chantability; 28
 and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. 29
According to the UCC, a seller creates an express warranty if
the seller makes affirmations or promises concerning product qual-
ity, and these statements form a "basis of the bargain" between the
seller and purchaser. 3° The UCC does not require proof that the
buyer actually relied on the seller's statements when purchasing the
product. 3 ' Rather, a seller's affirmation or promise will become the
(West 1980) [hereinafter WiirrE] (the authors recognize that strict tort liability is often
indistinguishable from liability for breach or an implied warranty of merchantability).
" Product liability law is primarily a matter of state law. This Note does not examine
every jurisdiction's application of product liability concepts. Rather, it is intended as a general
overview of product liability law in cigarette litigation.
2" See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210-11 (D.N.J. 1988) (defen-
dant cigarette manufacturer liable to deceased smoker's husband for breach of express
warranty); Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (D. Mass. 1988) (plain-
tiff's claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability is viable against cigarette
manufacturer); Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988) (plaintiff's
failure-to-warn claim is viable as pertains to cigarette manufacturer's pre-1966 conduct);
Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 523 A.2d 712, 716-17 (N.J. Super. L. 1986),
aff 'd as. modified, 542 A.2(1 919, 925-26 (N.J. Super. 1988) (plaintiff's design defect claim
against cigarette manufacturer is not preempted).
2" By 1979 the U.C.C. "had become the law in all states but Louisiana, and law in the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands." WHITE, supra note 23, at 1. All cites in this
Note arc to the Uniform Commercial Code, however, the code adopted by an individual
state may vary.
27 U.C.C. 2-313 (1988).
2" Id. § 2-314 (1988).
" Id. § 2-315 (1988).
50 Id. § 2-313(1)(a) (1988).
" Id. § 2-313, official comment 3 (1988) notes in pertinent part:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no
particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them
into the fabric of the agreement. (emphasis added).
Id. See aLso, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1965)
(plaintiff's actual reliance on express warranty is irrelevant in an action for breach); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 213-14 (D.N.J. 1988) (citing U.C.C. comment 3,
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basis of the bargain if such a statement. is designed to induce product.
purchases." The courts, recognizing the intent and effect of mass
media advertising, have held that an advertisement creates an ex-
press warranty to the general public if the advertisement makes
claims regarding product quality in an effort to promote sales."
Implied warranties, by contrast, are created as a matter of law
and thus are independent of a seller's statements concerning prod-
uct quality. 34 The UCC's implied warranty of merchantability re-
quires that sellers offering goods for sale to the public on a regular
basis must warrant that their goods are "fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which such goods are used."'" The courts have construed
this provision to mean that products offered for sale must perform
according to reasonable consumer expectations:'" when a consumer
uses the product as intended, or in a manner reasonably foreseeable
to the seller." Additionally, the UGC provides that a seller impliedly
warrants a product is fit for a particular purpose when a buyer
communicates a particular need to the seller, and relies on the
seller's superior skill and judgment in providing a product to satisfy
the specified need."
Unless a seller takes the necessary action to disclaim" its express
or implied warranties, a court will impose liability on a seller for
breach if the seller's product fails to perform as warranted, and
such failure is the proximate cause of an injury." Breach of war-
court concluded that proof of plaintiff's actual reliance is not necessary to maintain a breach
of express warranty claim). But see Cipollone, 693 F. Stipp. at 214 (court recognizes that other
courts and commentators have held that the buyer must prim, actual reliance in order to
maintain a breach of warranty action). See generally write, supra, note 23, at 332-39 for a
general discussion concerning the confusion as to whether actual reliance is necessary to
create an express warranty.
52 Prikhard, 350 F.2d at 483; Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at. 214; see also, Prosser, infra note
37, at 837.
55 Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 483-89; Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 214.
54 See BLACK'S LAW DturrolvAitv 1423 (5th ed. 1979).
" U.C.C. § 2-314(1)(c) (1987).
4" The consumer expectation test is the same under both strict liability and breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15,
19 (D. Mass. 1988).
" Koller, 685 F. Supp. at 19; Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,501-03 (8th
Cir. 1968). See also, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rev. 791,825-26 (1966).
5" U.C.C. § 2-315 (1987).
59 U.C.C. § 2-316 (1987). This section sets forth the necessary actions a seller must take
to disclaim any sales warranty. To disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability, the seller's
disclaimer must mention merchantability and, in the case of a writing, it must be conspicuous.
Id, 2-316(2) (1987). An implied warranty may be excluded under § 2-316(3).
d" U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987) official comment 13 (1988).
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ranty occurs when a product either fails to satisfy reasonable con-
sumer expectations, or fails to perform as promised. Breach of an
express warranty and breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose operate on a theory quite different from strict
liability; 4 ' that is, breach occurs regardless of seller fault or negli-
gence whenever a product fails to perform as promised." Breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability, however, occurs only if
a seller markets a product in a condition or manner that renders
the product more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would
reasonably expect." Thus, the plaintiff establishing a prima facie
case for breach of warranty, whether express or implied, must show
the creation of a warranty, breach of the warranty due to product
non-performance or defect, and that the product non-performance
or defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Prior to 1963, the warranty theories of recovery dominated the
area of product liability." There were problems with this approach,
however, because warranties were subject to the limitations of con-
tract law and the Uniform Sales Act." The most notable limitation
in sustaining a breach of warranty action was the privity require-
ment." Only an aggrieved buyer in "privity of contract" with the
offending seller could bring a warranty claim. 47 The limitations of
contract law spurred the development of strict liability in tort as an
alternative method for holding manufacturers and remote sellers
accountable to the consuming public for product-related injuries."
The tort theory of strict liability holds that a defendant must
pay damages to an injured plaintiff even though the defendant
neither intentionally nor negligently caused the plaintiff's injury."
Under English common law, the courts employed a strict liability
theory to hold owners of domesticated farm animals responsible for
" WHITE, supra note 23, at 326.
42 J. HENDERSON, JR. & A. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 82,84
[hereinafter HENDERSON]. See generally WHITE, supra note 23, at 339-43.
" Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F, Supp. 15,19 (D. Mass. 1988) (the court noted
that under Massachusetts law reasonable consumer expectations determine whether goods
are merchantable).
" Prosser, supra note 37, at 801. (Note that Prosser states the year as 1962; however, the
year is 1963, the date of the Greenman decision. The cause of error appears to be a misprinted
decision date for Greenman in the California Reporter).
" Prosser, supra note 37, at 801; Prosser, supra note 23, at 1127-34.
46 See, Prosser, supra note 23, at 1099-1100; PROSSER, supra note 9, at 681-84.
" PROSSER, supra note 9, at 681, 684; see Prosser, supra note 37, at 793-94.
"' See generally Prosser, supra note 23; Prosser, supra note 37.
99
 PROSSER, supra note 9, at 534.
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any damage their animals caused when trespassing on another's
land.5° The English courts also expanded this theory of liability to
impose financial accountability on parties engaging in "abnormally
dangerous" activities. 5 '
Although the American courts adopted the common law theory
of strict liability for some dangerous activities, 52 they refused to
apply this tort concept in most product liability cases)' American
courts preferred utilizing the negligence doctrine of res ipsa laquitur54
in product liability claims where lack of privity barred a plaintiff's
warranty action. 55 in addition to permitting negligence claims
against remote sellers, the courts also promulgated a privity excep-
tion in the food products area."
Beginning in 1913, 57 state courts began fashioning an addi-
tional exception to the privity requirement to allow consumers to
recover against remote sellers of tainted food products. 58 Although
the courts labeled such actions "warranty" claims, the courts actually
held purveyors of food and drink strictly liable for the wholesome-
ness of their products. 59 Gradually, courts began expanding strict
liability, without privity, to include sellers of any products intended
for intimate bodily use, 6° including cigarettes.°'
55 Id. at 538-41.
51 Id. at 545; see also Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 269 (Exch. 1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L.
339 (1868); Wade, On the Nature Of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826-
27 (1973).
51 See, e.g. Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1208,
1211, (Alaska 1978) (court imposed strict liability on company storing dynamite); Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 859, 865, 567 P.2d 218, 220, 223, (1977) (court imposed
strict liability on company for crop dusting with pesticides).
" See generally Prosser, supra note 23f, at 1103; Prosser, supra note 37v, at 793.
54 Under [the] doctrine of yes ipsa loquitur the happening of an injury permits an
inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury
was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and man-
agement of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979). See generally PROSSER, supra note 9, at 242—
62.
" See Prosser, supra note 23, at 1100.
5" Id. at 1103.
• 7 Id., at 1106; Wade, supra note 51, at 825 n.3. See also Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75
Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913) (first case to extend strict liability for tainted liiod products
beyond privity of contract),
" Prosser, supra note 23, at 1106.
See generally id. at 1106-10.
n"' Id. at 1111-12; see also, Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d l9, 25 (5th
Cir. 1963).
Lartigue, 317 F,2d at 34; Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.211 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1964).
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Finally, in the 1963 landmark case Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. the Supreme Court of California imposed strict liability
on the manufacturer of a defective power too1.62 In Greenman a
defective power saw caused a wood chip to fly up out of the saw
and strike the plaintiff on the forehead, seriously injuring him. The
court held that strict liability in tort governs a manufacturer's re-
sponsibility for defective products. The court further held that in
order to find a manufacturer strictly liable a plaintiff must prove
that an unknown product defect rendered the product unsafe for
its intended use and was the proximate cause of his or her injury.""
Other jurisdictions immediately accepted the Greenman court's hold-
ing that strict liability in tort determines a manufacturer's or seller's
responsibility for product safety. 64
The conversion of product liability from a theory of recovery
sounding in contract to one sounding in tort was completed in the
mid-to-late 1960s. 65 In 1965, the American Law Institute published
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts (Second Restate-
ment), detailing a seller's strict liability in tort for product-related
injuries. 6" The authors of the Second Restatement wanted to make
certain that strict product liability did not transform sellers into
absolute insurers of product safety."' Therefore, the Second Res-
tatement limited a seller's strict product liability to instances where
the injury-causing product was sold "in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property."tie
59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901-02, 27 Cal. Rptr. 647, 701 (1963).
6' Id. at 64. 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
c-1 Prosser, supra note 37, at 804 (listing cases).
"5
 PROSSER, supra note 9, at 581-82, 694.
"6 Section 402A reads in pertinent part:
§ 402A, Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product 1 -rom or entered into
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
67 See Wade, supra note 51, at 828, 830-31.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A (1965); see also PRossER, supra note 9, at 698.
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The Second Restatement defines "defective condition" as a product
condition "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which [ren-
ders the product] unreasonably dangerous to him."" 9 Thus, to re-
cover under strict liability, a plaintiff must. prove the product is
unsafe because something is wrong with it. 70
Section 402A soon swept the country and strict product. liability
became the dominant theory of recovery. Courts, however, arc di-
vided on the proper test for determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous. The majority of jurisdictions employ the
"consumer expectation" test.n These courts interpreted Greenman
and the Second Restatement" as establishing the proposition that
a product is unreasonably dangerous only if an unknown defect"
makes the product more dangerous than a reasonable consumer
would expect. 74 Therefore, a product is not unreasonably danger-
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
7" Wade, supra note 51, at 830.
C1.011111 v. j.11.1 7... Olson Corp., 8 Ca]. 3(1 121, 131, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440, 501 P.2(1
1153, 1160 (1972) (noting that a majority (*jurisdictions adopted the consumer expectation
test ()I' § 402A). See generally ['ROSSER, SUpat note 9, at 698-99 for a discussion of the
consumer expectation test.
72 RESTATE?.IEls"r (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A comment i (1965) is printed below in full
because of its particular relevance to cigarette litigation (the reader will often be referred
back to this section). Continent i defines "unreasonably dangerous" as Follows:
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective constitution of die product makes it to ireasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. Many pr(iducts cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all
consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if
only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics,
and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. Thai is
not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold
Ilium be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary Consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge conmurn
to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because it will make sonic people drunk, and is especially
dangerims to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of
fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably danger-
ous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco con-
taining something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits
cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contami-
nated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEN1ENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or Toms § 402 continent n (1965) notes: "If the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unrea-
sonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery." Id.
74
 Wade, supra note 51, at 829; see Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 131. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 1160-61,
501 P.2d at 440-41.
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ous if a consumer, knowing the product's true characteristics, would
nonetheless still use the product.
The minority position employs what may be called the "reason-
able manufacturer" test. 75 This test first assumes that a seller knows
the true condition of its product and the risks associated with its
use.Th After imputing knowledge of the product's true condition
and attendant risks, the test becomes whether a reasonable manu-
facturer (or seller) would place this product in the stream of com-
merce. 77
Jurisdictions employing the reasonable manufacturer/seller test
must necessarily perform a product risk/utility analysis. 78 This anal-
ysis is similar to the analysis for determining whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous. 79 The risk/utility analysis employs seven fac-
tors to determine whether a product's risks outweigh its social util-
i t- . 80y lf, in its present condition, a product's risks outweigh its social
utility, it is unreasonably dangerous because a reasonable manufac-
turer or seller would not market this product. 8 ' If, however, a
product's social utility outweighs its inherent risks, the product is
73
 PROSSER, supra note 9, at 701-02 (refers to this test as the "hindsight negligence" test).
76 ld.; see also Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036
(1974).
77
	 supra note 9, at 701; see also Phillips at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036; Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669 (D.N.J. 1986) (citing Feldman v. Lederle Labo-
ratories, 97 N.J. 429, 451, 479 A.2d 374 (1984)).
78 See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 701; Wade, supra note 51, at 837-41. Professor Wade
was the first to propose the risk/utility test as a more meaningful alternative to the consumer-
expectation test. Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D.N.H. 1988).
79 Wade, supra note 51, at 835-36, n.36-38.
"° Id. at 837-38. Professor Wade lists the seven factors to be considered in a product's
risk/utility analysis as follows:
(I) The usefulness and desirability of the product — its utility to the user and
to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product — the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their knowledge of the obvious condition of the product. or the existence
of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id.
m , Id. at 839-40.
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deemed "unavoidably unsafe," 82 and the seller incurs no liability if
the product causes injury."
In jurisdictions applying the risk/utility theory, a non-defective
product may be found unreasonably dangerous if the product's
inherent risks outweigh its social utility. 84 In the majority of courts,
however, a plaintiff must prove that a product is both defective and
unreasonably dangerous. The requisite product defect may come
from any of three sources: a manufacturing flaw, a product design
defect, or an inadequate warning."
A manufacturing flaw results when something goes wrong with
the manufacturing process and causes an unintended product
flaw. 86 Manufacturing flaws, therefore, exist when the manufactur-
ing process creates a product that is appreciably different than
intended, or in comparison to similar products. Design defects, by
contrast, may exist even when the manufacturing process creates
the intended product, and all products are of similar quality. 87 To
determine whether a design is defective, a court must employ the
risk/utility analysis. 88 If the design's utility outweighs the design's
risks, the design is not defective. If, however, the opposite is true,
a design defect exists.
Apart from these physical product defects, a manufacturer may
also be held strictly liable for failing to warn of any inherent product
dangers that are not patently obvious to the consumer. Courts gen-
erally apply the "foreseeability doctrine" to limit a manufacturer's
strict liability for failure to warn. 89 That is, a manufacturer must
• 52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comme-nt k (1965) (an unavoidably
unsafe product is a product that is incapable of being made safe for its intended and ordinary
use but whose benefits outweigh its inherent risks).
" See Wade, supra note 51, at 839-40; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
continent k (1965).
" Wade, supra note 51, at 831-41; see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184-
85, 463 A.2(1 298, 306 (1983); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669-71
(D.N.J. 1986); Cianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D.N.11. 1988).
85 PROSSER, supra note 9 at 695; see, Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 669; Gianilsis, 685 F. Supp.
at 856; Sentowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-CV-118, slip op. at 10 (N.D.N.Y.
August 18, 1988).
88 PROSSER, supra note 9 at 695; see also Wade, supra note 51, at 831; Phillips v. Kimwood
Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 (1974); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,
94 N.J. 169, 180-81, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983).
87 Wade, supra note 51, at 830; see Phillips, 269 Or. at 494, 525 P.2d at 1037; O'Brien, 94
N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304.
8' PROSSER, supra note 9; at 698-99; Wade, supra note 51, at 831-32; see Phillips, 269 Or.
at 494, 525 13.2d at 1037; O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d 304.
'9 PROSSER, supra note 9 at 697; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment
j (1965).
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only warn of any reasonably foreseeable risks associated with its
product's intended or foreseeable use."" Reasonably foreseeable
risks, however, are generally predicated on expert knowledge of a
product's inherent danger at the time of distribution."' Thus, a
manufacturer has a duty to warn potential users or consumers if
.available scientific knowledge or industry expertise indicate an in-
herent danger in the foreseeable use of its product, and this danger
is not readily apparent to the potential user or consumer.
The product warning serves two purposes."' It should alert any
potential user of any attendant danger, and also it should convey
enough information concerning a product's risks so that a potential
user may make an informed decision whether to use the product.
Thus, courts have held that a manufacturer's warning must be
timely," and designed in both form and substance to apprise a
potential user of any danger."' Furthermore, a manufacturer may
not significantly diminish the effectiveness of its warning through
its advertising or promotional activity. 95
Once a plaintiff establishes that a product or its warning is
defective, he or she must still prove the defect rendered the product
unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect proximately caused
his or her injury." A court will apply either the consumer expec-
tation test or the reasonable manufacturer test to determine
whether the product defect was unreasonably dangerous. 97 To es-
tablish the requisite causation, the plaintiff must prove that the
product defect "more likely than not" caused his or her injury."
Thus, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of strict product
liability when he or she can show that an unreasonably dangerous
product defect proximately caused his or her injury.
9" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
McLeod, MOO note 2, at 1041; see, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 737 F.2d
462, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447
A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982).
92
 WILMA, supra note 2, at 1040-53.
93 Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043-47.
95 Id. at 1046-47.
96 PROSSER, supra note 9, at 712-13 (details plaintiff's burden of proof in product liability
case).
97
 Some courts now allow a plaintiff to prove a defect under either test. See, e.g., Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 420-29, 432, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233-37, 573 P.2d
443, 452-55 (1978); Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 542 A.2d 919, 925 (N.J. Super.
1988).
98 See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 712-13.
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The defendant manufacturer, however, may defend against a
strict product liability suit using an affirmative defense of contri-
butory negligence, comparative fault, or assumption of the risk.•
No matter which defense is used, the defendant, must prove that
the plaintiff either used the product improperly, or that the plaintiff
knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of using the product.'""
To prove the former, the defendant must show that the plaintiff
used the product in an unexpected and unforeseeable manlier, and
that the plaintiff's abnormal misuse increased the risk of injury.'"
To prove the latter, the defendant must show that the plaintiff
either discovered or knew of the product defect but, nevertheless,
continued to use the product.'" 2
As early as 1918, courts utilized the yes ipsa loquitor doctrine
and the privity exception for food product manufacturers to hold
the tobacco industry liable under negligence and breach of warranty
theories, when tobacco products have contained foreign substances
that injured consumers.'°' Liability has been imposed on a tobacco
manufacturer in this type of situation because the presence of a
foreign substance leads to the presumption of a manufacturing flaw.
No court, however, had ever found a tobacco company liable for
an injury caused by the inherent, but harmful, substances contained
in non-defective tobacco products. The first and second wave
smoker-plaintiffs sought to change this by utilizing the developing
theories of product liability to impose liability on cigarette manu-
facturers for causing their smoking-induced illnesses.
B. The First Wave of Cigarette Litigation
As far back as the 1930s, medical researchers suspected a link
between cigarette smoking and cancer.'" By 1954 the American
Cancer Society felt there was sufficient evidence to issue a public
resolution announcing a causative link between smoking and lung
cancer.m 5 As the evidence concerning smoking's harmful effects
grew and became public, smokers who had developed lung cancer
a See PRossr.a, supra note 0, at 710-12; Prosser, ,supra note 37, at 824-28,838-40.
'"'' See Paossi,.k, supra note 9, at 710-1'2; Prosser, stora note 37, at 824-28 and 838-40.
im See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 711.
1 " See id. at 712; see also Pritchard v, Liggett Sc Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479,484
(3d Cir. 1965) ("Assumption of risk in its primary and strict sense involves voluntary exposure
to an obvious or known danger.").
1 "3 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
304
 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-6.
1 "5 hlcElvaine, supra note 6, at 168 n.20 (citing N.Y. Times, Oct. '23,1954, at 17, col. 1),
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began suing cigarette manufacturers for marketing the cigarettes
that the smokers believed were responsible for causing their ill-
nesses. 106
Consistent with prevailing legal practice, plaintiffs brought
these product liability suits under negligence and breach of war-
ranty theories.' 07
 Although plaintiffs successfully circumvented the
privity requirement in bringing these suits,'" juries and courts
proved unsympathetic to their plight. Despite evidence suggesting
the tobacco industry failed to test cigarettes' safety adequately,'° 9 or
warn of smoking's dangers,"° juries consistently found cigarette
manufacturers' conduct non-culpable."'
10" See Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L. REV. 678, 680-84
(1966) (detailing the health controversy surrounding smoking during the 1950s and 1960s).
107 See, e.g., Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co„ 328 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff reached
jury on negligence and breach of implied warranty claims); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. 317 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff reached jury on negligence and breach of
implied warranty claims); Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff
reached jury on negligence and breach of implied warranty claims).
'"" See, e.g., Lartigue, 317 F,2d at 35 (no privity requirement under Louisiana law in an
action against a cigarette manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); Ross, 328 F.2d at 7
(no privity requirement under Missouri law in an action against a cigarette manufacturer for
breach of implied warranty).
1 °9
 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 1961), In
overruling the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim the Third
Circuit noted that:
there was evidence that in 1952 defendant conducted tests admittedly to deter-
mine the effects of smoking Chesterfields on the nose, throat and accessory
organs. Apparently, this was the only test undertaken by defendant to determine
the harmful effects on human beings from smoking its products.... As a result
of this test, it was concluded that smoking Chesterfields had no harmful
effect[s].... There was evidence in the record that these tests were inconclusive
and inadequate as the basis for such a conclusion. . . . Furthermore, between
1921 and 1953, defendant made no tests to determine the carcinogenic content
of Chesterfields, or the relationship between lung cancer and smoking.
Id.
" 0 /d. at 299-300. In overruling the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant on
plaintiff's negligent failure-to-warn claim, the Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff produced
several expert witnesses to support his contention that scientific knowledge of the causative
link between smoking and cancer existed as early as the mid 1930s. Id.
During the first wave, a cause of action existed only for a "negligent" failure to warn.
See, e.g., Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 299 (under Pennsylvania law "one who supplies a product to
another and knows or should know that the foreseeable use is dangerous to human life
unless certain precautions are taken ... is under a duty to warn the user of such conse-
quences").
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit noted in Lartigue that under Louisiana law a manufacturer
may be found negligent for failing to warn the public of "some inherent danger or defective
condition of his product." Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 40. The plaintiff, however, must establish
that the manufacturer actually knew or reasonably should have known of the existing danger,
ILL Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1965) (jury
found the defendant was not negligent); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir.
July 1989]
	
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY	 1119
Yet plaintiffs' inability to prove cigarette manufacturer culpa-
bility did not affect the viability of their claims based on breach of
implied warranty." 2 Breach of implied warranty claims are based
on strict liability."' Therefore, to prevail, the plaintiff must only
impugn the product's merchantability, not the manufacturer's or
seller's conduct." 4 Thus, plaintiffs reasoned that the only prereq-
uisite for recovery under a breach of warranty theory was to estab-
lish causation." 5
This plaintiffs' theory, however, went unrecognized as the re-
curring theme in the first wave of cigarette litigation was marked
by a judicial unwillingness to make the tobacco industry absolute
insurers of tobacco proclucts. 116 Courts observed that food product
manufacturers were strictly liable for consumer injuries only when
their products were spoiled or contained a deleterious foreign object
1964) (general jury verdict for defendant on negligence and breach of implied warranty
claim); Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 23 (general jury verdict fo r the defendant on negligence and
breach of implied warranty claim); Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir.
1962) (jury found the defendant. was not negligent; plaintiff did not appeal negligence
finding).
" 2 Lai.ligue, 317 F.2d at 24 (under Louisiana law a manufacturer of products intended
for human consumption is strictly liable, regardless of fault, to consumers for breach or
warranty); Ross, 328 F.2d at 8 (Missouri law imposes strict liability on cigarette manufacturers
for breach of implied warranty regardless of privity or negligence); see also Pritchard, 295
F.2d at 296 (under Pennsylvania law cigarette manufacturer inipliedly warrants that cigarettes
are "reasonably fit and generally intended for smoking without causing physical injury");
Wade, supra note 51, at 825.
" 3 Sec Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 24; Ross, 328 F.2d at 8; Wade, supra note 51, at 825.
1 " See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 24; Ross, 328 F.2d at 8; Wade, supra note 51, at 825.
" 3 Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cit.. 1962). Plaintiff's argument
received support. in Judge Cameron's dissent in Green when the judge noted:
Under Florida's law, the implied warranty [of merchantability] was au uncon-
ditional guarantee to Green that the use to which the cigarettes would be put,
as understood by all, would not do him harm by reason of any deleterious
substance or ingredient contained in them.
Id. at 81 (Cameron, J., dissenting); see also Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 107 (5th
Cir. 1968). The Fifth Circuit held that under Florida law the plaintiff-smoker "was entitled
to rely on the implied assurance that ... cigarettes were wholesome and fit for [smoking]
.. [and] the merchant [was] absolutely liable for [his] injuries [because the plaintiff had
previously proven causation]. Id. This holding was overruled, however, hy the Fifth Circuit
sitting en bane. Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166, 1166 (5th Cir. 1069).
The Third Circuit its Pritchard held that a cigarette manufacturer impliedly warrants
that cigarettes are "reasonably fit and generally intended for smoking without causing physical
injury." 295 F.2d at 296. This appears to establish the proposition "that cigarettes would be
deemed umnerchantable if the smoker suffered physical injury as a result of smoking."
Garnet', supra note 6, at 1427.
" '3 Sec also Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 541-52 (5th Cir. 1970)
(per curiam); Green v. Am. Tobacco Co„ 391 F.2d 97, 111-13 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
911 (1970); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., Ltd., 328 F.2d 3, 10-14 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 38-40 (5th Cir. 1963).
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or substance."' The courts, therefore, developed similar rationales
for limiting a cigarette manufacturer's strict liability for smoking-
related injuries.
In Green v. American Tobacco CO., the first wave's longest and
most famous case," 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit fashioned two different rationales for limiting a ciga-
rette manufacturer's strict liability. First, the circuit court inter-
preted Florida law as limiting the scope of a manufacturer's implied
warranty to reasonably foreseeable product risks." 9 Second, after
the Supreme Court of Florida corrected the circuit court's earlier
interpretation of Florida law,'" the Fifth Circuit held that a cigarette
manufacturer is liable for breach of implied warranty only if a
plaintiff establishes that cigarettes pose a health risk to a substantial
number of smokers.'"
The Green case began in 1957 when Edwin Green, Sr., brought
suit against a cigarette manufacturer to recover for lung cancer he
allegedly contracted from smoking the defendant's cigarettes.' 22 Mr.
Green began smoking at age sixteen, and continued smoking be-
tween one and three packs of cigarettes per day for over thirty
years. In 1956, doctors diagnosed Mr. Green as having inoperable
lung cancer, which resulted in his death two years later at the age
of forty-nine.'" At the completion of trial the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that a manufactur-
er's implied warranty does not cover unforeseeable product dan-
gers.'" The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.' 25
117 Iii 	 317 F.2d at 30; Ross, 328 F.2d at 9-10; Green, 391 F.2d at 108-09 (Simpson,
J., dissenting).
' 18 See, McElvaine, supra note 6, at 169; Garner, supra note 6, at 1423. The Green case
took over twelve years to litigate and involved two jury trials and six appeals. Green v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir, 1962), question certified on rehearing, 154 So. 2c1 169 (Fla.
1963), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded an rehearing, 391
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curium 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970).
119 Green, 304 F.2d at 77.
122 Green, 154 So. 2d at 170-71,173 (Fla. 1963) (Supreme Court of Florida held that the
foreseeability doctrine does not limit a manufacturer's implied warranty).
1" Green, 391 F.2d at 101, rev'd per cutiam, 409 F.20 1166,1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane).
122 Green, 304 F.2d at 71.
123 Id, at 77 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 72-73.
115 1d. at 7l. The jury answered special interrogatory number (4) which read in pertinent
part:
(4) Could the defendant on, or prior to, February I, 1956, by the reasonable
application of human skill and foresight have known that users of Lucky Strike
cigarettes, such as the decedent would be endangered by the inhalation of the
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Although the jury found that smoking caused Mr. Green's lung
cancer, it also found that a cigarette manufacturer could not have
Foreseen that smoking would cause harm. Therefore, according to
the jury, the manufacturer was not liable for Mr. Green's unforeseen
lung cancer. 126 The plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment
entered pursuant to the jury's verdict, contending that the jury's
finding on causation entitled him to judgment as a matter of law.' 27
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, however, and upheld the jury
verdict. The court reasoned that a manufacturer's superior skill and
knowledge concerning product fitness creates its implied warranty
of merchantability because a buyer necessarily relies on this skill
and knowledge in purchasing a product. Such buyer reliance is
unjustified, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, if no reasonable application
of human skill or foresight would reveal a hidden product defect
to the seller.' 28 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held, the scope of a manu-
facturer's implied warranty is limited to foreseeable product risks
under Florida law.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit asked the Supreme Court of
Florida whether its interpretation of Florida law was correct, and
granted plaintiff's petition for a rehearing.' 20 The Florida Supreme
Court answered that the foreseeability doctrine does not limit a
manufacturer's implied warranty under Florida law.'" Although
the Florida court refused to hold cigarettes unmerchantable as a
matter of law,' 31 it did rule that a manulacturer's implied warranty
of product "wholesomeness'"' is based on the product's actual
safety.' 3"





The jury returned a general verdict fur the defendant, and the trial court entered
judgment fbr the defendant pursuant to the verdict. Id. at 71-72.
12,1 1d. at 71-72.
127 Id. at 72.
124 See id. at 77.
I" Green, 304 F.2d 70, (5th Cir. 1962), question certified an rehearing, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1963), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Green v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
391 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1968).
IS" Green, 154 St). 2d at 172.
'"' Id. at 170.
"2 The courts use the term "wholesomeness" to connote product purity; i.e. that a
product is not spoiled and does not contain harmful, foreign substances. See Green, 325 F.2d
at 676; Green, 304 F.2d at 82.
199 Green, 154 So. 2d at 173.
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On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit reversed its earlier holding, but
refused to impose liability on the defendant-manufacturer as a
matter of law.' 34 According to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff must
still prove the defendant's cigarettes were not "reasonably fit and
wholesome" for smoking in order to recover. A warranty of whole-
someness did not guarantee the goods were incapable of causing
injury, the Fifth Circuit reasoned.' 33 Although the dissent argued
that a finding of causation means that the defendant necessarily
breached an implied warranty based on actual product safety,' 36
 the
Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a new trial
on the sole issue of whether the defendant's cigarettes were "rea-
sonably fit and wholesome" for human consumption.' 37
At the completion of the second trial, the district court in-
structed the jury that a breach of implied warranty "occurs only if
the defendant's cigarettes endanger 'any important number of
smokers.'"' 38 The second jury also returned a verdict for the defen-
dant. Once again the plaintiff appealed, and reiterated his claim
that the previous finding of causation entitled him to a directed
verdict.' 3O
This time the Fifth Circuit agreed. By a 2-1 majority, a three-
judge panel from the Fifth Circuit decided to set aside the second
jury verdict, and to hold the cigarette manufacturer absolutely liable
as a matter of law.I'10 The majority opinion, borrowing the previous
dissent's rationale, reasoned that the actual safety of the product to
the individual consumer is determinative of a manufacturer's lia-
bility once causation is established."' The previous dissent noted
that a tobacco company impliedly warrants that smoking cigarettes
' 34 Green, 325 F.2d at 677,679.
135 Id.
' 36 Id. at 681 (Cameron, J., dissenting). Judge Cameron reasoned that:
The contract here was between the Tobacco Company and Green. The warranty
embodied by the law in every sale the Company made to him was that the
cigarettes purchased by him would do him no harm.
... The finding of the jury has settled the fact that the cigarettes sold to
Green were not reasonably lit and wholesome for use by him. No other question
is ... involved under the law of Florida with which alone we are dealing.
Id. at 680-81.
'" Green, 391 F.2d at 101.
' 38 Id.
1 " Green 391 F.2d at I 0 I . The finding or causation was binding on the second jury and
the issue could not be re-litigated.
to Id. at 106.
' 4 ' Id. at 105-06.
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will not harm a smoker; therefore, if smoking causes injury, the
tobacco company is liable for such injury. 142
The dissenting judge in the second panel, however, argued that
the imposition of absolute liability on cigarette manufacturers was
contrary to product liability law. 145 A manufacturer is strictly liable
but not absolutely liable, the dissent reasoned, for the safety of its
products.'" The dissent noted that strict liability requires that the
product causing harm also be unreasonably dangerous."' Further-
more, the dissent argued that a product is unreasonably dangerous
only if it contains a defect that renders it unsafe for consumer use,
or if the product is inherently dangerous absent a defect. Thus,
according to the dissent, a cigarette manufacturer is liable only if
its cigarettes contain a harmful, foreign substance not present in
well-made cigarettes, or if cigarettes, as a whole, are found to pres-
ent a danger to a substantial portion of the public. Because the
plaintiff did not claim that the defendant's cigarettes were defec-
tive,'" the dissent reasoned that, whether cigarettes were reasonably
"wholesome and fit" was not a question of their actual safety, but a
question of fact for the jury. 147
The rationale of this dissent prevailed.'" Sixteen months later,
by an 8-3 majority, the Fifth Circuit rehearing Green en banc in
1969 overruled the previous panel's decision citing the dissent's
rationale. Thus, the second trial court's judgment for the defendant
was affirmed, and when the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in 1970 the Green case finally came to an end. 149
The Fifth Circuit's first limitation on a cigarette manufacturer's
liability was not discarded, however. In Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. 150 and Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co)." the Fifth and Eighth
142 Green, 391 F.2d at 106; see also Green, 325 F.2d at 681 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
143 Green, 391 F.2d at 108-13 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 108-09 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
1"5 Id. at l 10 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
'"6 Green, 325 F.2(1 at 676.
17 Green, 391 F,2(1 at 113 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
148 Green, 409 F.2d at 1166.
11" Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
15° 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). Lartigue was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in 1970.
Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 541 (5th Cir. 1970). In 1984, however,
the Fifth Circuit repudiated Lartigue and held that, under Louisiana law, a manufacturer's
knowledge rewarding the dangerous qualities of its products is irrelevant in determining
liability. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 737 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1984), panel
opinion recalled per curiam, 752 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1985), question certified to Louisiana Supreme
Court per curiam, 755 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane), question certified on rehearing, 484 So.
2d 110 (La. 1986), aff 'd, 788 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1986).
1 " 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1,964).
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Circuits, respectively, upheld jury verdicts in favor of cigarette man-
ufacturers. These courts held that a manufacturer is not an insurer
against the unknowable.' 52 Both cases involved smokers' suits
against tobacco companies to recover for lung cancer. The circuit
courts recognized that a cigarette manufacturer impliedly warrants
the wholesomeness of cigarettes, but concluded that the manufac-
turr is not an absolute insurer of this product. 153 The courts noted
that the scope of a manufacturer's reasonable knowledge limits its
warranty, and that, therefore, the manufacturer's implied warranty
does not cover risks that are unknowable. Thus, according to the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, a cigarette manufacturer's implied war-
ranty of wholesomeness does not guarantee that cigarettes do not
contain carcinogenic substances unless the manufacturer had reason
to know that such substances were present.'"
The first wave of cigarette litigation was not completely void of
plaintiff-smoker victories. Yet these victories never resulted in an ill
smoker obtaining recovery from a tobacco company. In Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 155 smokers received their most favorable
judicial rulings.''" The Pritchard case was a suit brought in 1954 by
Otto Pritchard against a cigarette manufacturer seeking recovery
for his lung cancer allegedly contracted as a result of cigarette
stnoking.' 57 Pritchard began smoking when he was fifteen years old,
and smoked at least a carton of cigarettes per week for over thirty
years.'" In 1953, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having lung cancer,
and doctors removed his right lung.'"
In 1954, Otto Pritchard brought suit against the manufacturer
of his brand of cigarettes in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania for marketing the product that
caused his lung cancer.' 6" The district court dismissed Pritchard's
breach of warranty claim and directed a verdict for the defendant
on Pritchard's negligence claim. 161 The United States Court of Ap-
'" Ross, 328 F.2d at 12; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39.
155
 Ross, 328 F.2d at 13-14; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39.
154
 Ross, 328 F.2d at 13-14; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39.
1" 134 F. Supp, 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), rev'd and remanded, 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961),
rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1965) opinion amended per curiam, 370 F.2d 95 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
I" Garner, supra note 6, ai 1427; McElvaine, supra note 6, at 170.
1 " Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 294.
158 Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482.
1 " Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 294.
'" Pritchard, 134 F. Supp. at 830.
' 61 Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 292-93.
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peals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment on
both . counts and remanded the case for a new trial.
In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the warranty claim,
the Third Circuit noted that a seller's warranty of merchantability
is a warranty "that the goods are reasonably fit for the general
purposes for which they are sold." 1"2 Commentators have hypoth-
esized that Pritchard would have recovered under a breach of im-
plied warranty theory had he chosen to pursue it.' 63 Instead, how-
ever, the plaintiff on remand brought his case under negligence
and breach of express warranty theories. 164 The Pritchard jury re-
turned a verdict for the delendant. 1 "5 Although the jury found that
smoking caused the plaintiff's lung cancer, it also found that the
defendant had not been negligent and that the plaintiff had not.
relied on the defendant's express warranties. Additionally, the jury
found that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of smoking cigarettes.
The plaintiff appealed once again, and this time the Third
Circuit reversed the jury verdict and remanded the case for a new
trial solely on the breach of express warranty claim.'" The Third
Circuit held that assumption of the risk is not a defense to a breach
of warranty claim unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff
reasonably should have known that cigarette smoking was danger-
otts. 1i7 The circuit court also held that the plaintiff's actual reliance
is irrelevant in an express warranty claim under Pennsylvania law
when the warranties are directed to the general public. Under
Pennsylvania law, the court noted, an express warranty exists if a
manufacturer makes affirmations regarding product quality to the
public in order to induce purchases. Despite the court's dicta indi-
cating "overwhelming evidence" in support of his claim,'" the plain-
tiff voluntarily discontinued his suit.'""
In summary, the courts' failure to hold the tobacco industry
"absolutely" liable for the harm caused by tobacco products domi-
nated the "first wave" of tobacco litigation."" The courts steadfastly
I" Id, at 296.
' 63 Garner, supra note 6, at 1427-28; McElvaine, supra note 6, at 170. Note that Pritchard
established causation at. trial. Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482.
11" Garner, supra note 6, at 1427; McElvaine„supra note 6, at 170. See generally, Pritchard,
351) F.2(1 at 482.
11 ' Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482.
1 " 6 Id. at 487.
117 Id, at 485.
'"" Id. at 486.
'' Garner, supra note 6, at 1426, 1427 n.26.
1.1" To summarize, there were ten reported cases during the "first wave" of tobacco
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refused to impose strict liability on cigarette manufacturers absent
a showing of culpability or the discovery of a foreign substance in
the tobacco. The juries, for their part, failed to find the tobacco
industry culpable, and refused to return verdicts for the plaintiff-
smokers based on the evidence presented. Lastly, the courts abso-
lutely refused to hold that cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous .
(i.e., unmerchantable) as a matter of law.
C. The Second Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The "second wave" of tobacco litigation is the term used to
identify the new wave of lawsuits that smokers and their families
have brought against the tobacco industry during the 1980s. 17 ' The
second wave of suits appeared as increasing scientific evidence was
published that overwhelmingly established cigarette smoking as a
major cause of illness and death in the United States. This conclu-
sive scientific evidence meant that cigarette manufacturers could no
longer dispute that cigarettes endangered a "substantial segment"
of the American public. Thus, the first wave's two judicial limitations
on a cigarette manufacturer's strict product liability were no longer
valid. 172
litigation. Garner, supra note 6, at 1426. In addition to the live cases discussed in the text the
remaining cases and their disposition were as follows: Padovani v. Bruchausen, 293 F.2d 546
(2d Cir. 1961); Fine v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mitchell v.
Am. `tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960). These cases were all voluntarily
discontinued by the plaintiffs. See Garner, .supra note 6, at 1426, n.26. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464, 465 (1st Cir. 1958) (per curium) (summary judgment affirmed
because the plaintiff was unable to produce evidence of any of the advertisements which she
claimed that the decedent relied on); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp.
341, 343, 352-53 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (case dismissed because court held that the plaintiff had
received a previous settlement as compensation for the injuries claimed in this suit).
17 ' Currently, there are more than 100 lawsuits pending involving tobacco product
liability. Janson, supra note 6, at Al, col. 6.
"2
 The increased scientific knowledge on the health risks of smoking clearly shows that
cigarette smoking poses a serious health threat to a substantial segment of the public. See
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. The findings in these cases clearly invalidate the
previous judicial limitations on the scope of a cigarette manufacturer's liability: Hudson v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) (scope of manufacturer's liability is
determined by its reasonable knowledge and the foreseeability of the harm caused by its
product); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13-14 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 39 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d
1166 (5th Cir, 1069) (cigarette manufacturer is liable for breach of implied warranty only if
it can be shown that smoking poses a threat to a substantial segment of the population).
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I. Significant Events Preceding or Affecting the Second Wave
Cigarette Litigation
Although plaintiff-smokers hoped to use this increased scien-
tific knowledge to build on the limited success of the first wave of
cigarette litigation, several developments combined to cast doubt on
the viability of their continued efforts to obtain recovery from ill-
ness. First, in 1965, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act.'" The federal act, which took effect on
January 1, 1966, was a congressional response to the Surgeon Gen-
eral's 1964 report on cigarette smoking's serious health hazards.' 74
The federal act mandated that cigarette manufacturers must place
a specific warning on each cigarette package to alert the smoker to
the health risks associated with cigarette smoking.'" The declared
congressional purpose. for this federal enactment was to adequately
inform the public of cigarette smoking's adverse health risks.'m
Second, also in 1965, the American Law Institute published section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts outlining the parameters
of a manufacturer's strict tort liability for product-related injuries.
The Second Restatement expressly exempted a cigarette manufac-
turer from liability for smoking-related injuries that were caused
by smoking unadulterated, i.e., wholesome, tobacco.' 77 Additionally,
the Second Restatement dictated that a product is unreasonably
dangerous only if it is more dangerous than a reasonable consumer
would expect. Third, the enormous publicity surrounding the 1964
Surgeon General's report, and other subsequent studies on smok-
ing's adverse health effects, rendered cigarette smoking's harmful
17' See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (l)AT 1984).
174 Ewell, supra note 16, at 878. The federal act was a congressional compromise to avoid
a complete prohibition un the manufacture and sale of cigarettes. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp.
at 1147.
175 See Ewell, supra note 16, at 879, n.83. Ewell notes that the 1965 Act provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or package for sale
or distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which
fails to bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be
Hazardous to Your Health." Such statement shall be located in a conspicuous
place on every cigarette package and shall appear in conspicuous and legible
type in contrast by typography, layout, or color with other printed matter on
the package,
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 283).
176 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1982).
177 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). See supra note 72 for
the text of' comment i.
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characteristics common knowledge.'m This combination of factors
made it doubtful that a plaintiff could show that he or she was
unaware of cigarette smoking's attendant health risks, or that cig-
arettes were more dangerous than a consumer would reasonably
expect.
Nevertheless, the viability of cigarette litigation remained un-
certain because other, equally pertinent, developments supported
the imposition of strict tort liability on cigarette manufacturers for
the harm attributable to cigarette smoking. First, and most impor-
tantly, increased scientific evidence indicated that cigarette smoking
is addictive. 179 Second, a number of courts held, in product areas
other than cigarettes, that a manufacturer's compliance with federal
warning requirements does not automatically immunize the man-
ufacturer from liability for failure to warn.'" Third, courts had
I's See Garner, supra note 6, at 1428-29; see also, Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (ED. Tenn. 1985).
179 See Garner, supra note 6, at 1430-34. Although Garner recognizes that the Surgeon
General's 1979 report listed cigarette smoking as a "habituation" rather than a "dependency,"
i.e., an addiction, because smoking's withdrawal symptoms are riot comparable to those
produced by addictive substances, he also noted that numerous health organizations recog-
nized tobacco as an addictive substance and some equated it with addictive drugs. Id. at 1432.
Garner cited to the following reports and studies to support his tobacco addiction argument:
COMMITTEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF 'ME AMERICAN Ps vm nicrittc; ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 93-99 (3d 'ed. 1980); ROYAL
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS REvowr 98, 107 (1977); U.S. DEP'T or HEALTH, Enuc., AND WELFARE,
NATIONAL. INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, RESEARCH ON SMOKING BEHAVIOR 214 (1977); WORLD
HEALTH ORG.. YOUTH AND DRUGS, REPORT No. 516, 9 (1973); Dolin, Smoking: Still a Burning
Issue, 18 Am. PHARMACY, issue 10, at 31 (1978); Id. at 1432, n.70.
Moreover, the increasing evidence on tobacco addiction has led to change this classifi-
cation of cigarette smoking as an habituation. Edell, supra note 2, at 103. The Surgeon
General now classifies cigarette smoking as physiologically addictive, as do the National
Institute of Drug Abuse and the American Psychiatric Association. Id, Additionally, medical
research has determined that nicotine, which is present in tobacco and cigarette smoke, is sit
addictive drug that causes the smoker's inability to quit smoking despite his or her awareness
of its health risks. Pullin, The Role of the Addictive Process as a Key Step in Causation of All
Tobacco-Related Diseases, 252 J. A.M.A. 2874, 2874 (1984). Dr, Pullin, who is the Director of
the National Institute for Drug Abuse, describes cigarettes as a "powerfully addictive drug,"
more addictive than heroin or alcohol. Also, in 1979 the National Institute on Drug Abuse
concluded that "cigarette smoking behavior should be considered a form of addiction, and
tobacco in the form of cigarettes, all addicting substance." NATIONAL. INSTITUTE ON DRUG
ABUSE or THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FINAL REPORT: TECHNICAL REVIEW ON SMOKING
As AN A oincrioN 0 (1979). Such scientific findings have led a presidential panel to reann-
mend that tobacco he classified as a drug and regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.
AP, Panel: Tobacco should be a drug regulated by the FDA, Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1989, at 61,
col. 3.
I" See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (1). Mass. 1986) (citing
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529. 1539-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1985); MacDonald v. Orr ho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 394 Mass. 131, 140,475 N.E.2d
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begun to apply a risk/utility theory in product liability litigation,
and had held manufacturers strictly liable for non-defective, injury-
causing products when a product's inherent risks outweighed its
social utility.' 8 ' In order to understand fully the interrelationship
of these factors and their potential impact on cigarette litigation, it
is necessary to examine each factor in depth.
The tobacco addiction argument was first proposed in 1980 by
Professor Donald Garner' 82 as a way for smoker-plaintiffs, in ciga-
rette litigation, to overcome the affirmative "assumption of the risk"
defense.'" As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit noted in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., the contri-
butory negligence defense is not available in a product liability
case.'" The Pritchard court. did hold, however, that a defendant
manufacturer may utilize assumption of the risk in defending a
product liability action: 85 The Pritchard court noted that a plaintiff
who voluntarily exposes himself or herself to a known danger as-
sumes the attendant risk, and thus may not recover for any injuries
resulting from such exposure. The Second Restatement added the
additional requirement of unreasonableness. According to the Sec-
ond Restatement, courts should deny a consumer recovery for prod-
uct-related injuries only if his or her continued use of a defective
product was both voluntary and unreasonable: 8" Thus, Garner
argued, tobacco addiction makes an assumption-of-the-risk defense
impotent and establishes a prima facie product liability case for
65, 70 (1985); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C. 1976); Biasing v.
P.R.L. Hardenbergh Co.. 303 Minn. 41, 49, 226 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1975); Stevens v. Parke,
Davis & Cu., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 56, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Maize v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 56.41 A.2d 850, 853 (1945)).
1 " See Ha1phen v. johns-Manville, 484 So. 2d 110, 113-14 (La. 1986). The Ilalphen court
noted that a product may be judged unreasonably dangerous per se "solely on the basis of
[its] intrinsic characteristics . . . irrespective of the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or
conduct." Id. at 113. The Ilalphen court noted that a product is unreasonably dangerous per-
se if the product's inherent risks, whether foreseeable or not, outweighed its social utility.
Such a product, the Halphen court noted, gives rise to the purest form of strict product
liability.
I " McLeod, supra note 2, at 1071 n.310.
I" See generally Garner, supra note 6.
1 " 350 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 19(15); see also Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d
542, 544 (Iowa 1980).
'"" Pritchard, 350 F.2{1 at 485.
"" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 902A comment n. (1965) states in pertinent part:
"'ill the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it. lie is barred from
recovery. Id. (emphasis in original). See also, Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542,
545 (Iowa 1980).
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failure to warn.'" This result should occur, Garner argued, because
failure to warn adequately of the danger of tobacco addiction ex-
poses a smoker to the danger and renders his or her continued
cigarette smoking both reasonable and involuntary.' 88
 Thus, failure
to warn of addiction exposes a plaintiff-smoker to possible tobacco
addiction and the serious health risks associated with continued and/
or excessive smoking.
The tobacco addiction argument finds support, as Professor
Garner noted, in the 1974 case of Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories,
Division of Sterling Drug, Inc.' 89 In Crocker, Glenn Crocker became
addicted to a new painkiller, "talwin," that had been previously
thought to be non-addictive.'" Mr. Crocker's talwin addiction even-
tually led him to obtain an injection of a narcotic, which, in turn,
caused his death. In Crocker the Supreme Court of Texas held the
manufacturer of talwin liable for Mr. Crocker's injuries resulting
from his drug addiction and for his wrongful death, despite the
fact that the court found talwin to be a "good and useful" drug
with no adverse side effects for the great majority of users."' Al-
though the Crocker court imposed liability on the drug manufacturer
because it found that the manufacturer had misrepresented talwin's
addictiveness,"2 the Crocker court noted, in dicta, that liability might
also have been imposed because the drug manufacturer failed to
'7 Garner, supra note 6, at 1937-49,
'" Id. at 1448-49. Garner hypothesizes that plaintiffs beginning to smoke cannot be
found to be unreasonable because the danger of tobacco addiction is neither known or
appreciated. Id. at 1449. A smoker's continued smoking cannot be found to be voluntary
because of his or her addiction.
1 " 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
90 id.
191 Id. at 432. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals had reversed the trial court's judgment
for the plaintiff because it determined that Crocker's addiction was an "abreaction." Id. at
431. The court defined abreaction as "an unusual reaction resulting from a person's suscep-
tibility to the product in question; that is, such person's reaction is different in the presence
of the drug in question from that in the usual person." Id. "An abreaction is one which could
not have been reasonably foreseen in an appreciable class or number of potential users prior
to the time Glenn E. Crocker became addicted or dependent on Tal•in." Id.
192 Id. at 433. The Crocker court noted that, although the plaintiff had sought recovery
Cm failure m warn of talwin's possible addictiveness, it was not upholding the trial court's
judgment on this ground, because it was not prepared to bold the III:11111E1=rer o f a beneficial
drug liable for an inadequate warning based on these facts. instead, the Cracker court imposed
liability on the manufacturer because the court found that Winthrop Laboratories misrep-
resented that talwin was non-addictive. This finding allowed the Crocker court to impose
liability on Winthrop Laboratories regardless of the state of medical knowledge and/or the
rare susceptibility of the user.
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warn adequately of talwin's possible addictive side-effect.'" The
Crocker court recognized that a manufacturer may expose itself to
liability for failure to warn of a product's addictiveness even if' its
failure endangered only a few users.'"4
Related to Garner's tobacco addiction argument is the fact that
a number of American courts have held that a manufacturer's
compliance with federal warning requirements does not automati-
cally immunize the manufacturer from failure-to-warn claims.["' In
the 1984 case"Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a herbicide
manufacturer may be found liable for failing to warn adequately of
a chemical herbicide's inherent danger, even though the manufac-
turer had affixed an EPA-approved warning label on its product
that complied with federal statutory labeling requirements.' 9" Fed-
eral warning requirements were traditionally regarded as establish-
ing minimum levels of safe conduct, the Ferebee court noted.' 97 The
Ferebee court then recognized that mere compliance with federal
labeling requirements did not preclude a jury finding that these
labeling requirements were inadequate, and imposing liability on
the responsible manufacturer for failure to warn. Thus, it follows,
as commentators have surmised, that smoker-plaintiffs may chal-
lenge the adequacy of the congressionally mandated warnings on
cigarette packages.'"
Such a judicial conclusion in the area of cigarette litigation
would buoy an injured smoker-plaintiff's chances of recovering
against a cigarette manufacturer for three reasons. First, the re-
quired warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements have
never warned of the danger of tobacco addiction or death. In fact,
' 93 Id. at 431-33.
194 Id. at 432.
1115 See supra note ISO and accompanying text.
196 736 F.2d 1529, 1532, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Ferebee, a United States Department
of Agriculture employee's estate and surviving children brought a failure to warn claim
against the manufacturer of a herbicide known as paraquat. Id. at 1531-32. The plaintiff's'
complaint alleged that the decedent's long-term skin exposure to paraquat caused him to
contract pulmonary fibrosis and die. The plaintiffs sought recovery against paraquat's man-
ufacturer, Chevron, for failing to adequately warn that long-term skin exposure to paraquat
could cause serious lung disease. After two trials, a jury returned a $60,000 verdict in
plaintiffs' favor.
197 Id. at 1543,
198 Garner, supra note 6, at 1453-54; Ewell, supra note 16, at 902-19; McLeod, supra
note 2, at 1045-47.
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the tobacco industry's powerful lobby has successfully opposed the
inclusion of any warning requirement that mentions addiction or
death. "9 Second, the congressionally mandated warnings have been
vague and general. 20° Congress, itself, has felt it necessary to revise
its statutory warning requirement three times since 1966. Third,
despite a congressional ban on television and radio cigarette adver-
tising since 1971, 20 ' cigarettes remain the most heavily advertised
product in America. It is estimated that, in 1986 alone, cigarette
manufacturers will spend $2.3 billion on promoting cigarette
sales. 2"2
According to the prevailing body of law regarding a manufac-
turer's potential liability for failure to warn, these three factors,
either individually or in combination, might provide a smoker-
plaintiff with a legal basis for recovery for his or her smoking-
' induced illnesses. As discussed previously, failure to warn of poten-
tial tobacco addiction may provide a basis of recovery for injured
smokers. Additionally, smokers could challenge the adequacy of a
cigarette manufacturer's congressionally mandated warnings as
being too vague or general to apprise them adequately of cigarette
smoking's inherent dangers. Lastly, a smoker-plaintiff might also
contend that the cigarette manufacturer's overpromotion rendered
its warnings ineffectual. 203
A manufacturer has a duty to warn potential consumers or
users whenever an inherent product risk would affect a reasonable
10" Goldsmith, Tobacco-Addiction-Death Link Shown But Labels Don't Tell It, 255	 A.M.A.
997, 997 (1986).
200 Commentators have speculated that the congressionally mandated warnings on cig-
arettes would not satisfy the adequate warning criteria as it has developed in other areas of
product liability law. See Brody, Recovery Against Tobacco Companies, 21 Trial 48, 49-50 (Nov.
1985); McLeod, supra note 2, at 1064-67.
soy 15 U.S.C.	 1335 (1982).
m Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Serial No. 99-167, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
[hereinafter Tobacco Advertising Hearings], opening statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, at subcommittee meeting on Friday, July 18, 1986, Mr. Waxman noted that in
1986 the cigarette industry will spend an estimated $2.3 billion on advertising and promoting
cigarette sales. Id. at 2.
203 See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (overpromotion
of a drug may erode its warning's effectiveness); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51,
66-67, 507 P.2d 653, 662-63, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 54-55 (1973) (drug manufacturer held
liable for wrongful death because its promotion activities rendered the warning on its anti-
biotic ineffective); Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.V. 1968)
(drug manufacturer held liable because its advertising techniques led doctors to prescribe
dangerous drugs).
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consumer's decision whether to purchase or use the product in
question. 204 The attendant manufacturer's warning must be clear
and tinderstandable. 2115 Thus, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit sustained a jury verdict imposing liability on an
insecticide manufacturer in the 1965 case of Hubbard-Hall Chemical
Co. v. Silverman for failing to use the traditional skull-and-crossbones
symbol to indicate that its insecticide was poisonous. 21" In Hubbard-
Hall two Puerto Rican farm workers were killed after using the
defendant manufacturer's insecticide, Parathion. 217 One of the farm
workers could read some English while the other could not read
any. The First Circuit upheld the jury verdict, and imposed liability
on the manufacturer for failure-to-warn despite the presence of an
extensive, federally-approved warning on the insecticide con-
tainer. 208 The First Circuit reasoned that the manufacturer should
have foreseen that farm laborers with limited reading abilities would
use its insecticide and, therefore, should have added a skull and
crossbones, or other comparable symbol, to its warning. 209
In addition to being clear and understandable, a warning must
also be prominent, 210 and sufficient in substance to adequately con-
vey to the user or consumer the nature and extent of a product's
inherent risks.' ][ The adequacy of a warning in a products liability
2' 1 Hotel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2(1 1076, 1089, (5th Cir. 1973), ceri,
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
2" See e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965);
Hayes v. Kay Chem, Co., 135 III. App. 3d 932, 935, 482 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1985); Campos v.
Firestone Tire Sr Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 208, 485 A.2d 305, 305, 310 (1984).
2 ' 1' 1 Hubbard-Hall, 540 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965); ;tee also CaMPOS, 98 NJ. at 208, 485
A.2d at 310 (court determined that a jury may find a manufacturer liable for tailing to use
international or symbolic warning signals to indicate product danger).
212 Hubbard-hall, 340 F.2d at 403-04.
2 "8 Id. at 403, 405.
""' Id. at 405,
21 " See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 82, 85 (4th Cir. 1962) (warning in
small print on the back of furniture polish container was inadequate); Maize v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 55-50, 41 A.2d 850, 852 (1945) (instructions in small print on
proper use of solvent were inadequate); see also Michael v. Warner/Chilcou, 91 N.M. (151,
655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978). The Michael court noted that the "physical
aspects of the warning — conspicuousness, prominence, relative size of print, etc. — must
be adequate to alert the reasonably prudent person." Id. (citing First Nat. Bank, Albuquerque
v. Nor-Am Agr. Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 83-84, 537 P.2d 6132, 691 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975)).
2" See Watson v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985); MacDonald
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 140-41, 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (1985); Scicy v.
G.D.'Searle Co., 67 Ohio St. 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981); Michael, 91 N.M. at 655,
579 P.2d at 187.
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case generally presents a question of fact for the jury. 212 The jury
standard for determining a warning's adequacy is based on whether
the warning in question would "reasonably" communicate to an
alert, reasonably prudent person the extent and/or seriousness of
the potential danger inherent in the product's intended or foresee-
able use.'" Thus, to be judged legally adequate, a warning must
fully and effectively communicate a product's inherent risks in a
manner that would alert a reasonably prudent user to the existence,
scope, and gravity of a product's inherent danger. 2 t"
Manufacturers of non-prescription drugs have been held to a
legal duty to warn consumers of all specific known product risks. 215
In the 1978 case of Michael v. WanterIChilcott the New Mexico Court
of Appeals held that the manufacturer of a non-prescription sinus
medicine may be found liable because the warning accompanying
its sinus medicine was ineffective and vague. 216 The plaintiff in
Michael had taken four of the defendant manufacturer's sinus tab-
lets per clay for approximately three years when he was diagnosed
as suffering from kidney failure. The drug manufacturer's warning
had stated that "this medication may damage the kidneys when used
in large amounts or for a long period of time."'" The Michael court
determined that this warning was inadequate because it did not
indicate that the medication is a dangerous drug that will damage
the kidneys. 2 " Furthermore, the Michael court found that the term
"large amounts" contained in the warning was vague and indefinite.
In this same regard, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, held in the 1979 case of Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories
that the manufacturer of Anacin may be found liable for failure to
warn. 219 The plaintiff in Torsiello suffered gastrointestinal bleeding
as a result of his taking eight Anacin tablets per day for a fourteen-
month period. In overruling the trial court's involuntary dismissal
of the case, the superior court held that an aspirin manufacturer
212 Watson, 775 F.2d at 1516.
21 See Ellis v. Intl Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 1984); MacDonald, 394 Mass.
at 140-41, 475 N.E.2d at 71; Michael, 91 N.M. at 655, 579 P.2d at 187; Torsiello v. Whitehall
Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 321, 398 A.2d 132, 137 (1979).
214 Torsiello, 165 N.J. Super. at 324, 398 A.2d at 139 (citing Michael v. Warner/Chilcou
91 N.M. 651, 579 1'.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1078)).
215 Michael, 91 N.M. at 655, 579 P.2d at 185, 187.
2 '" Id. at 652, 579 P.2d at 184.
2 " Id. at 655, 579 P.2d at 187.
218 Id.
211 165 N.J. Super. 311, 318, 328, 398 A.2d 132, 135, 141 (1979).
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had a duty to warn of aspirin's specific risks 220 concerning gastroin-
testinal bleeding if the manufacturer knew, or reasonably should
have known, that regular, prolonged use of aspirin would cause
gastrointestinal bleeding in an appreciable percentage of users. 221
The Torsiello court noted, .however, that, consistent with section
402A of the Second Restatement, the manufacturer had a duty to
warn of specific product risks only if the consuming public was
generally unaware of the product's inherent danger. 222 In this re-
gard, the Torsiello court recognized that the jury could have reason-
ably found that an aspirin manufacturer's advertising and mass
marketing strategies were designed to assure consumers that aspirin
is harmless and inherently safe. 225
Perhaps, though, the high water mark of a warning's required
specificity was recognized in 1985 in MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceu-
tical Corp. 224 In MacDonald, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
Carole D. MacDonald, a woman in her late twenties who suffered
a stroke as a ,result of her taking prescription birth control pills. 225
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, overturning the trial
court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant,
held that the jury might reasonably have concluded that the warning
accompanying Ortho's birth control pills was inadequate. 22" The
22" Id. at 32 l, 398 A,2d at 137. The TorJtello court noted that the specific product risk in
question was gastrointestinal damage due to prolonged use. The manufacturer's warning on
the Anacin package read as follows;
CAUTION — It' pain persists for more than 10 days or redness is present, or
in arthritic or rheumatic conditions affecting children under 12 years of age,
consult. a physician innuediately.
Id, at 316, 398 A.2d at 134-35.
221 Id. at 321, 398 A.2cl at 137.
222 TOT5i4/0, 165 N.J. Super. at 321, 398 A.2d at 137.
223 Torsiello, 165 N.J. Super. at 322. 398 A.2d at 138; see also Leichtamer v. Am. Motors
Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 459-60, 469, 424 N.E.2d 572-73, 578 (1981). In Leichtamer
plaintiff's were injured or killed when they drove a Jeep model cu-7 off the top ()I' ;I hill
ridge, traveling approximately 50 feet through the air before lauding upside down at the
bottom of a hill 23.5 feet below. lit the plaintiffs' ensuing products liability suit against the
jeep's manufacturer, the plaintiffs alleged that American Motors' multi-million dollar adver-
tising campaign led them to believe that such off-road product use was safe and induced
their behavior, In affirming the jury verdict for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that a manufacturer's commercial advertising affects a consumer's reasonable product safely
expectations, therefore, the manufacturer's marketing campaign is relevant evidence in
determining what an ordinary consumer's reas onable expectations are regarding a product's
safety and its intended use. Id. at 469, 424 N.E.2d at 578.
224 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 92(1 (1985).
225 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 132, 134, 475 N.E.2d at 66-67. Ms. MacDonald had been
using the birth control pills for approximately three years under the supervision of her
gynecologist when her stroke occurred,
226 Id. at 141-42, 475 N.E.2d at 71-72.
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MacDonald court concluded that, although Ortho had warned that
its birth control pills could cause "abnormal blood clotting which
can be fatal," and further warned of the incremental likelihood of
hospitalization or death due to blood clotting in "vital organs, such
as the brain," a jury could reasonably find that Ortho's failure to
specifically warn of a "stroke" 227 may have unduly minimized the
warning's impact or lessened its effectiveness in the ordinary con-
sumer. 22" Thus, the MacDonald court determined that a jury could
impose liability on a drug manufacturer for failure to warn even
though the manufacturer had detailed and highlighted the risk of
death inherent in its product's use. 22"
Additionally, drug manufacturers have been found liable when
their marketing practices rendered their warnings ineffective. For
example, in 1973 in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. a prescription drug
manufacturer was found liable for overpromoting a broad-spec-
trum antibiotic known as Chloromycetin. 23" In Stevens, six pre-
scribed dosages of Chloromycetin caused a thirty-eight year old
mother of two to develop aplastic anemia which resulted in her
death approximately one year later. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, in affirming the jury verdict,"' that the manufacturer's ad-
vertisements and "give-aways" extolled the effectiveness of the drug
without mentioning its dangers, and, most importantly, that the
manufacturer's salespersons promoted Chloromycetin's use during
personal visits with physicians without reminding them of the drug's
possible adverse side-efTects. 232
 Thus, the Stevens court held that the
jury was justified in finding that the manufacturer's promotion
activities had overcome the effectiveness of its FDA-approved warn-
ings. 233 And in 1975 in the case of Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
another overpromotion case involving Chloromycetin, the United
State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that not only
may overpromotion erode the effectiveness of an otherwise ade-
227
 A stroke is an occlusion (blockage) of a cerebral artery by a blood clot.
22M MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 141, 475 N.E.2d at 71-72.
229 Id. at 141, 475 N.E.2d at 72. The MacDonald court rioted that a jury may conclude
that there ate fates worse than death. Id.
23°
 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rim.. 45 (1973).
Id. at 56. 73, 507 1'.2(1 at 055, 667, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 47, 59.
272 Id. at 67, 507 P.2d at 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 54. The Stevens court noted that the
highly effective promotional activity utilizing personal salesperson visits with prescribing
physicians was not employed to disseminate information on the drugs serious adverse side-
effects. even though such warnings would have entailed trio additional burden.
2" N. at 66. 5(17 P.2d at 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
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quate warning, but, in addition, a jury may infer that a warning is
inadequate if a manufacturer knows that its present warning is
widely disregarded and fails to change it. 231 Thus, given the various
failure-to-warn product liability theories, and the plausible analogy
of cigarettes to over-the-counter non-prescription drugs, smoker-
plaintiffs finally appeared ready to mount a successful product
liability suit against the cigarette industry.
Independent of the legal trends and precedents concerning a
manufacturer's duty to warn, another development in product lia-
bility law also fueled smoker-plaintiffs' optimism regarding the vi-
ability of future cigarette litigation. In the area of product liability
design-defect cases, plaintiffs were allowed to maintain a design-
defect claim without proving that an alternative, safer design ex-
isted. 235 To maintain such a design-defect claim a plaintiff had to
establish that a product's inherent risks outweigh its social utility.
Although this theory of product liability has riot gained great ac-
ceptance,"" in jurisdictions that do apply it, a smoker-plaintiff
would, conceivably, only need to prove that, cigarette smoking's risks
outweigh its utility. Furthermore, under such a standard, a cigarette
manufacturer could not claim that its compliance with industry
design standards immunized it from design-defect liability, 2 t17 nor
2" Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 13511, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975). The majority of
overpromotion cases involved a drug manufacturer's marketing activities involving the pro-
motion of prescription drugs directly to the prescribing physician. As a general proposition,
where iffescription drugs are concerned, the drug numuikturer's duty to warn is limited to
wanting the prescribing physician of a drug's potential danger. Ti,rsiello v. Whitehall Labo-
ratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 323, 3118 A.2d 132, 138 (1979). Thus, in t he area of prescription
drugs, a manufacturer generally has no duty to warn the ultimate drug user. The courts
have made an exception, however, in the area of prescription birth control pills because,
unlike prescription drug choice and use, the consumer is actively involved in the decision
whether to use "the pill." See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131,
139-37, 475 NI.E.2d 05, 69 (1985).
255 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 14 Ni. 169, 184-85, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983).
25" See, e.g., Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc., 762 F.2d 46 (6th Cir. 1985); Raschke
v. Carrier Corp.. l46 Ariz. 9, 703 1'.2c1 556 (1985); Troja v. Black & Decker Manufacturing
Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 914 Mich. 413,
326 N.W.2d 372 (1982); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
This theory of product, liability has been criticized. See, e.g., Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained
Federal Products Liability Bill: -.targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. Mica. J. L. REF, 575,
586-89 (1985); Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test Jar Design Defect: An
Economic Analysis, 84 Cot.uti. L. REA'. 2045 (1984).
2.v"
	 94 Ni. at 183-84, 463 A.2d at 3115. The O'Brien court noted that state-or-
the-art product design or compliance with prevailing industry custom is relevant to, but not
dispositive of, riskAttility analysis. Compliance with either is not an absolute defense to a
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could a cigarette manufacturer escape liability because a smoker-
plaintiff was unable to prove that a safer cigarette design existed.
2. The Second Wave of Cigarette Litigation
The smoker-plaintiffs' anticipated success during the current
"second wave" of cigarette litigation, however, has been largely
unrealized. The first second-wave lawsuit to get to a jury was the
1985 unreported case of Galbraith v. RI Reynolds Tobacco Co. 238 In
Galbraith, the plaintiff, a sixty-nine-year-old smoker named John
Galbraith, brought suit in 1982 against R.J. Reynolds alleging that
decades of smoking the defendant's cigarettes had caused his lung
cancer. 2"• The plaintiff's attorney in Galbraith, Mr. Melvin Belli, 24°
asserted that cigarettes were addicting and that R.J. Reynolds was
liable for failing to warn smokers of this inherent product risk. 24 '
The Galbraith jury did not accept the plaintiff's tobacco addiction
argument, and, after deliberating for one clay, returned a 9-3 ver-
dict for the defendant. 242
The fatal flaw in the Galbraith case may have been the plaintiff's
inability to establish causation.243
 Mr. Galbraith's attending physician
product liability action; "[Out is, a product may embody the state-of-the-art and still fail to
satisfy the risk-utility equation. IS.
25" See Kepko, supra note 5, at 290; Gidinark, supra note 8, at 18. The Galbraith case was
the first tobacco products liability case to go to a jury in more than fifteen years.
255 See Giclinaik, supra note 8, at 18. John Galbraith died later in 1982; his family
continued his lawsuit. John Galbraith had smoked from two to three packs of cigarettes per
day for most of his life. Kepko, supra note 5. at 290 n.219.
24" Melvin Belli is regarded as the "King of Torts." See, Symposium, Trying the Tobacco Case,
supra note 7, at 9. Mr. Belli was co-counsel in the first wave cigarette litigation case of Lartigue
a. Il.f. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
24 Kepko, supra note 5, at 290 (citing Bean, R.J. Reynolds Held Not Liable in Man's Death,
Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1985, at 2, col. 2).
212 See McElvaine, supra note 6, at 171; Kepko, supra note 5, at '290; Gidmark, supra note
8, at 18-19. Gidmark quotes a New York Times article reporting that several jurors rejected
the tobacco addiction argument and felt that John Galbraith had made a free choice to
continue smoking despite warnings from his doctor and others. Id. at 19. In the more tragic
case of Marsee v. U.S. Tobacco a jury refused to impose liability on the manufacturer of
Copenhagen snuff, a tobacco product. Id. at 18. In Marsee, a nineteen year old boy, Sean
Marsee, died irons tongue cancer allegedly contracted as a result of his seven year snuff
habit. The Oklahoma jury in Marsee returned a 6-0 verdict for the defendant despite the
obvious emotional appeal of the case, and the fact that smokeless tobacco did nol bear any
warning concerning its health risks. The Marsee jury was unconvinced that smokeless tobacco
had caused young Sean Marsee's cancer or that tobacco usage had any significant harmful
effects. Id. at 27-28. One Marsee juror even mistakenly believed that the Surgeon General
had retracted his statement that smokeless tobacco causes cancer. Id. at 27.
24" See McElvaine, supra note Iii, at 170-71: Kepko, supra note 5. at 290; Gidinark, supra
note 8, at 19. The jury forewoman in Galbraith, Ms. Stacie Proft, stated that she believed that
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testified that Mr. Galbraith did not die of lung cancer, 244 and his
death certificate, in fact, listed arteriosclerotic heart disease and
pulmonary fibrosis as the causes of Mr. Galbraith's death. 215 The
plaintiff's age, medical history, and his counsel's failure to provide
for an autopsy at the time of his death combined to significantly
weaken his case. 246 Despite its verdict, members of the jury indicated
that they might have found for the plaintiff if the evidence had
been stronger. 247
Although smoker-plaintiffs received another setback in Gal-
braith, the jury's comments, and apparent attitude toward cigarette
smoking, encouraged plaintiffs' attorneys to continue their cigarette
litigation efforts. 248 In fact, well-known tort lawyer j.D. Lee pre-
dicted that the first verdict against a tobacco company might come
as early as 1987. 249 Although Mr. Lee's prediction was wrong, he
did not err by much. On June 13, 1988 a New jersey jury returned
the first verdict against a tobacco company in the history of cigarette
litigation. 25" Thus, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. became the first
suit in cigarette litigation history in which a jury awarded a plaintiff
the majority was not convinced that Mr. Galbraith died of smoking-related causes or that he
was addicted to cigarettes. Gidinark, supra note 8, at 19,
244 Id. at 18.
245 McElvaine, supra note 6, at 171-72.
246.
	 McElvaine, .supra note 6, at 171-72; Gidtnark, supra note 8, at 19. One minority
juror stated that she believed that the majority "really felt that this was a difficult case because
the man was so ill." Gidmark, supra note 8, at 19. The medical evidence in Galbraith was
further complicated because the plaintiff had a long history of health problems unrelated to
smoking. Kepko, supra note 5, at 290 n.222. Additionally, experts lin• the Tobacco Company
testified that Mr. Galbraith actually died from heart failure, totally unrelated to his cigarette
smoking. TonAcco Ixons -rnv Crrion•ioN REP., Mar. 27, 1986, at 514-15. The plaintiff had
contended that he was dying from squamous carcinoma of the lung. Gidmark, supra note 8,
at 18. Mr. Belli had specifically sought out a smoker who was afflicted with this type of lung
cancer because it is inure conclusively linked to cigarette smoking than arc other types of
cancer. See Symposium, 'flying the Tobacco Case, supra. note 7, at 11. The conflicting evidence
concerning Mr. Galbraith's death combined with the failure of plaintiff's counsel to have an
autopsy performed greatly weakened the Galbraith case. See McElvaine, supra note 6, at 172.
247 Gidmark, supra note 8, an 28. Gidmark indicates that in addition to the three minority
jurors who found for the plaintiff perhaps four or live majority jurors might have voted for
the plaintiff if the evidence had been stronger. In addition, Stacie Proft, the Galbraith jury
forewoman, stated, "We want to stress that we don't like smoking, and we feel smoking is
harmful, and the only reason we didn't side with the plaintiff was that the evidence wasn't
there." McElvaine, supra note 6, at 172 n.38 (citing PROD. SAFETY & LIAIS. REP. (LiNA), Jan.
10, 1986, at 25, col. 2).
248 See generally Gidmark, supra note 8, at 28; Symposium, Trying the Tobacco Gage, supra
note 7, at 11, 13.
"4 Symposium, Trying the 'Tobacco Case, supra note 7, at 13. J.D. Lee was the plaintiff's
attorney in the cigarette litigation case of Roysdon a.,R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
2" See Janson, supra note 4, at Al, col. 6.
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damages for an injury caused by the consumption of the harmful
but inherent substances present in cigarette smoke.
The Cipollone case began on August 1, 1983 when the plaintiff,
Rose Cipollone, filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of New f ersey25 ' alleging that smoking the defen-
dant's cigarettes had caused her to develop lung cancer. 252
 Mrs.
Cipollone began smoking in 1942 at the age of sixteen, and, despite
her various attempts to quit, continued smoking from one pack to
one-and-a-half packs of cigarettes daily until 1983 when her lung
cancer was diagnosed as terminal. 253
 In October 1984, Mrs. Cipol-
lone died from lung cancer. Her husband, Antonio, continued her
product liability suit, both on his own behalf and as the executor of
his wife's estate. 254
 Mrs. Cipollone's original complaint sought re-
covery from three cigarette manufacturers for causing her alleged
smoking-induced illness. 255 Her complaint sounded in strict liability,
negligence, breach of warranty, and intentional tort. 256
After approximately five years of litigation, during which time
Mrs. Cipollone's original cause of action was severely limited, the
jury awarded Antonio Cipollone $400,000 for his loss of consor-
tium, but refused to award any damages to Rose Cipollone's estate
for her smoking-induced illness and death. 257
 Responding to specific
interrogatories, the jury found that prior to 1966 the defendant
breached express warranties regarding its product's safety, and that
during this same period the defendant manufacturer had also failed
to warn smokers adequately of cigarette smoking's inherent health
25 ' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986). The original
plaintiffs in the case were Rose Cipollone, a smoker dying from lung cancer, and her husband
Antonio Cipollone. They brought a product liability suit against the three cigarette manu-
facturers who made and marketed the various brands of cigarettes I Itat Mrs. Cipollone had
smoked during her lifetime. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149, 11.1
(D.N.J. 1984).
2" Id. at 1149. She alleged that her 41-year-long smoking habit proximately caused her
lung cancer.
2" Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
254 Id. at 1490; see also Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 668 (D.N.J. 1986).
255
 Mrs. Cipollone's complaint named three cigarette manufacturers (Phillip Morris,
Lorillard, and Liggett) as defendants. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149. She smoked
cigarettes manufactured by Liggett from 1942 until 1968, switched to brands manufactured
by Phillip Morris from 1968 to 1974, and, in 1974, she began smoking True cigarettes
manufactured by Lorillard based on the recommendation of her family doctor. Cipollone, 683
F, Supp. at 1489-90.
25" Cipollone, 593 F. Stipp, at 1149.
257 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988).
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risks. 258 The jury also determined that each cause of action proxi-
mately caused Mrs. Cipollone's lung cancer and death. 25" The jury
further concluded, however, that Mrs. Cipollone suffered zero dam-
ages and was 80 percent at fault for causing her own illness and
cleath. 21i" Lastly, the jury found that the defendant was not liable
for fraud or civil conspiracy. 2l'I The Cipollone district court entered
a judgment pursuant to the jury verdict, and affirmed this judgment
in response to motions from both sides. 2 "2
3. The Preemption Defense
Despite the fact that Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. became the
first tobacco product liability case to impose liability on a cigarette
manufacturer for causing a smoking-related illness, the case may
well be recognized as a significant plaintiff defeat, rather than a
breakthrough victory, 2"3 for a variety of reasons. 2 "4 The most sig-
nificant smoker-plaintiff setback in Cipollone was, undoubtedly, the
cigarette industry's successful implementation of the preemption
defense. 2"5 Since its introduction to cigarette litigation in 1984 the
preemption defense has become the cornerstone of the tobacco





262 Id. at 210,222-23,
a See Eichenwaki. supra 1101C 10, at 114, cols. I, 3-5; Janstm, supra note 4, at AI, col. 6.
211' See generally Eichenwald, supra note tO, at 114, col. 1-6; Janson, supra note 4, at A 1,
col. 6,134, cols. 1-5. A lawyer for Phillip Morris, one of the defendants in Cipollone, stated
that "[t]he plaintiff bar is not likely to regard this verdict as encouraging because they got
only 10 to 15 percent of their costs in prosecuting their suit. It's a breakthrough only in the
sense dial the industry had never lost a claim in a damage suit." Janson, SUP/ note 4, at 114,
col. 3.
265 Sympositon, frying the Tobacco Case, supra note 7, at 12. Plaintiff lawyer J.D. Lee noted
that the Third Circuit ruling favoring the preemption defense was the must. important
development in recent cigarette litigation.
266 See Ewell, supra note 16, at 886. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,187
(3d Cir. 1986). The district court noted that the "Supremacy Clause"  of the United States
Constitution, U.S. CoNsT., art. VI, cl. 2, dictates that a congressional act or treaty is the
supreme law of the land, and therefore, the distrid court concluded that state law must yield
to it. Cipollone, 593 F. Stipp. at 1150. Thus, the district court concluded that the "Supremacy
Clause" vests Congress with the ixiwer to either expressly or impliedly preempt state law in
any given area.
For an in depth discussion and analysis of the preemption doctrine especially as it relates
to cigarette litigation, see Ewell, .supra note 16. But see Thornton, The Liability of Cigarette
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The preemption defense was first raised by the defendant-
cigarette manufacturers in Cipollone in response to Mrs. Cipollone's
original complaint. 267 The preemption defense, as asserted in Ci-
pollone, maintained that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act (the federal act) preempted all of Mrs. Cipollone's tobacco
product liability claims. On September 20, 1984, in response to the
defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings and to Mrs.
Cipollone's cross-motion to strike the affirmative preemption de-
fense, District Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the United States District
Court for the District of New jersey issued the first published
opinion on the preemptive effect of the federal act on state com-
mon-law tort claims. 268 After an extensive analysis of the federal act
and its legislative history, Judge Sarokin held that the federal act
did not expressly or impliedly preempt the plaintiff's state tort
claims,26° and, as such, granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the
preemption defense. So began the preemption controversy.
In December 1985, District Judge Hull of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee reached a con-
trary conclusion in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. In Roysdon,
Judge Hull held that the federal act preempted a state common-
law tort claim for failure to warn. 27 ° Although Judge Hull agreed
Manitfacturers for Lung Cancer: An Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
and Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 Kv. 14 569 ( I 987 —
88).
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., the Third Circuit succinctly defined implied preemption
as follows:
Without ... express language, a court may find intent to preempt in two general
ways. . First, a court may determine that Congress intended "to occupy a
field" in a given area "because '[t]he scheme of federal regulation 'nay be so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it,' because 'the Act of Congress may touch a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed
to preclude enfOrcement of state laws on the same subject,' or because 'the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose . .'" Second, in those instances
where Congress has not wholly superceded state regulation in a specific area,
state law is preempted "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law
. ." The [Supreme] Court has stated that such conflict arises when "compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," . . . or where
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment arid execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
Cipollone, 789 F.2d at l85.
267 Cipollone, 593 E. Supp. at 1149.
"" See Ewell, supra note 16, at 886; Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1146.
269 Cipollone, 593 F. Stipp. at 1171. The doctrine of preemption allows Congress to
supersede state common law as well as state statutes and regulations. Id. at 1151.
171 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1190-91 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
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that the federal act did not expressly preempt state tort claims, he
determined that permitting a damage award based on a claim that
the warning on a cigarette package was inadequate would directly
conflict with the federal act's legislative intent."' According to Judge
Hull, exposing a cigarette manufacturer to a possible damage award
for failure to warn is an indirect method for requiring a more
stringent warning label on a cigarette package, and, therefore, con-
flicts with the federal act's congressional purpose."'
In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit adopted Judge Hull's rationale when it reversed the district
court's preemption holding in Cipollone. 273 The Third Circuit agreed
that Congress had not expressly preempted state tort claims when
it enacted the federal act. 274 The Third Circuit did hold in Cipollone,
however, that the doctrine of implied preemption partially
preempted the plaintiffs' product liability claims. 275
The Third Circuit began its implied preemption analysis by
attempting to ascertain whether Congress intended to preempt state
tort claims under either of the two recognized principles of implied
preemption. 276 First, the court determined that, in enacting the
federal act, Congress intended to "occupy the field" with respect to
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations. 277 Nevertheless, the
Third Circuit noted that the federal interest in this field was not so
pervasive that it preempted state tort claims challenging the ade-
quacy of the federal act's prescribed warnings. 27" Thus, the Third
Circuit concluded that the scope of the field that Congress intended
to occupy in enacting the federal act was limited and, as such, the
federal act does not preempt state common-law tort claims. 274-'
The second recognized implied preemption principle required
that the Third Circuit examine the extent to which the Cipollones'
271 Id. at 1191.
272 Id.
275
	 789 F.2d at 187.
274 Id. at 185.
277,
	 at 187.
27" Id. at 186.
2"hi. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's determination that "Congress
. intended to occupy a field" and 'indicated this intent as clearly as it knew how." Id,
(quoting Cipullone, 593 F. Stipp. at 1164) (emphasis in original).
27N Id.
277 Id. The court could not "say that the scheme created by the Act is 'so pervasive' or
the federal interest involved 'so dominant"' that the Act necessarily preempts the Cipollones'
state tort claims. Id. Nor was the court convinced "that the object of the Act and the character
of obligations imposed by it revealed] a purpose to exert exclusive control over every aspect
of the relationship between cigarettes and health." Id. (emphasis added).
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common-law tort claims actually conflicted with the federal act. 28°
State law actually conflicts with a federal statute, the court noted,
when the state law operates to frustrate the federal law's pur-
poses. 28 ' The Third Circuit then determined that the federal act's
policy provision, section 1331,282 read in conjunction with its
preemption provision, section 1334, 28' clearly revealed that Con-
gress intended to strike a careful balance between the need to warn
the public of the health hazards of smoking and the need to protect
the national economy. 284
 According to the Third Circuit, exposing
the tobacco industry to tort liability for complying with the federal
act285 would upset the delicate balance Congress intended to create,
"" Id. at 187.
2" Id. The Third Circuit had previously stated that state law "actually conflicts" with
federal law when compliance with both stare and federal law is physically impossible or when
state law acts to frustrate the congressional purpose of a federal statute. Although the Third
Circuit did not expressly consider the issue other courts have held that compliance with state
tort law and the Labeling Act is not "physically impossible. - Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167;
Palmer, 633 E Supp. at 1177.
a 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (the policy provision of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act). Section 1331 reads as follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising
with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby —
(l) the public inay be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be
hazardous to your health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package
of cigarettes; and -
(2) commerce anti the national economy may be (A) protected to the max-
imum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with
respect to any relationship between smoking arid health.
Id.
2"3 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (the preemption provision of the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act). Section 1334 reads as follows:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall he im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions
of this chapter.
Id.
264 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186. The Third Circuit in Cipollone felt the express language of
the statute clearly stated Congress's intent; therefore, it was unnecessary to examine the Act's
legislative history.
2" The original Act required the following warning on cigarette packages:
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
This warning was amended by Congress in 1969 as billows: Warning: The Surgeon
General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1976).
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and thus actually conflict with the federal act. 28" Therefore, the
Third Circuit. held in Cipollone that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act impliedly preempts any state tort claim that
challenges the adequacy of Congress' prescribed warnings on a
cigarette package, or the tobacco industry's advertising and pro-
motional activity. 287
Subsequent to the Third Circuit's 1986 opinion in Cipollone
several courts have refused to apply the preemption defense ret-
roactively.288 The federal act became effective January I , 1966;
therefore, according to these courts only post-1965 claims that chal-
lenge the congressional warning requirements or the tobacco in-
dustry's promotional activity are preempted. 289 A plaintiff may still
bring pre-1966 claims against cigarette manufacturers, just as he or
she may bring any product liability claims that do not challenge the
federal act's prescribed warning or advertising requiretnents. 2 `16 The
majority of American courts, 2" 1 including every circuit court that
This required warning section was again amended by Congress in 1984 by prescribing
the following four warnings:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quilting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant, Women May Result in
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
§ 1333(a) (1984). These Four warnings are to be rotated on a quarterly basis in alternating
sequence. Id, 4 1333(c).
25" Cipollone. 789 F.2d at 187.
210 Id. The Labeling and Advertising Act was amended by Congress in 1984 by adding
a reference in the Act's policy provision, section 1331:
"(I) the public may he adequately iniOrmed about any adverse health effects of cigarette
smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each adver-
tisement of cigarettes . .." 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (Stipp. 11 1984).
2" Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.I'L 1988); Kotler v. Am.
'Tobacco Co., 085 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. Mass. 1988); Setnowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., (183 F. Supp.
1487, 1496-97 (D.N.J. 1988), ;radium denied, 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988); Phillips v.
R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
"'' See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
2'"} Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Stipp, 664, 671 (D.N.J. 1986) (design defect
claim and "unreasonably unsafe product" claim are independent of a failure-to-warn claim
and, hence, are not preempted); Koller, 685 F. Supp. at 19-20 (plaintiff's design defect claim
is not preempted by Federal Labeling Act); Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 523
A.2d 712, 717 (N.J. Super. 1088), aff'd an- modified, 542 A.2d 91!) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1088) (plaintiff's design defect claim based on a risk/utility analysis is not preempted by the
Federal Labeling Act); Semowich, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 9102 at 2, 17 (design defect claim is
not preempted),
21" Semozoieh, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 9102 at 4-5. The court noted that "IWIliether the
Act preempts state law claims ... has been addressed by a number of courts 	
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has considered the issue, 292 have followed the third circuit's ration-
ale and holding on preemption. Therefore, the preemption defense
is now firmly established in cigarette litigation as an effective bar to
most cigarette product liability claims.
The Minnesota State Court of Appeals, however, in the 1988
case of Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. rejected the majority's
preemption analysis. 293 The Forster court held that the federal act
does not preempt state tort claims:29' The court noted that in 1984
the United States Supreme Court refused to recognize the preemp-
tion of state tort claims against the nuclear power industry.despite
the federal government's comprehensive regulation of this indus-
try. 295
 The Forster court reasoned that the same arguments then
must surely be rejected when considering the federal act's preemp-
tive effect on state tort claims.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized in Forster that our
system of federalism demands a strong presumption against
preemption. 2° Congress failed to expressly preempt state tort
claims in the federal act's preemption provision, the Forster court
noted, and its examination of the federal act's legislative history
revealed nothing to suggest a congressional intent to preempt state
tort claims• 297 Additionally, the Forster court recognized that pro-
tecting the health and safety of its citizens was traditionally a state
function, and that preempting state tort claims would leave a state's
Third Circuit held that the Act preempts state law claims . . . .1andi ['Three other circuit
courts ... as well as a host of federal district courts and state courts have reached the same
result." Id. "In fact, only [Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.] ... is cited for a contrary
result." Id.
292 Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 23(}, 234 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 629 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. Am. Brands, Inc., 825
F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
187 (3d Cir. 1986).
"3 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
141 rd. at 700-01.
245 Forger, 423 N.W.2d at 697-98. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the tobacco
company's argument that cigarette manufacturers are "entitled to special treatment because
their industry is subject to 'comprehensive' regulations." Id. at 697. The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court "has recognized (that] federal regulation and state tort law can
— and must — coexist." The court also rejected the cigarette manufacturer's contention that
an award of damages under state tort law would frustrate the congressional purpose of
protecting the national economy. Id. at 698. The court noted that "if the nuclear industry
does not deserve protection at all costs' certainly neither does the tobacco industry."
2"6 Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 692. The court observed that: "[P]re-emption or state law by
federal statute or regulation is not favored in the absence of persuasive reason — either that
the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress
has unmistakably so ordained. — Id. at 695. (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609 (1981)).
247 Id. at 696, 699.
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personal injury victims without a remedy. 208 Thus, the Forster court
held that only a clear and actual conflict between state tort claims
and the federal act is sufficient to support a finding of implied
preemption. 299 When the health and safety of citizens is at stake,
the Forster court reasoned, a potential conflict between state tort
claims and the federal act's stated congressional purpose is "too
• i
speculative" to support an implied preemption finding."°
The Forster court, balancing state interests against the federal
act's stated congressional purpose, determined that the potential
regulatory effects of exposing the tobacco industry to tort liability
were insufficient to frustrate the purposes of the federal act and,
hence, insufficient to justify a finding of implied preemption."'
Although the Forster court noted that the federal act expressly stated
an intent to protect the national economy, the court concluded that
Congress could not have intended to protect the tobacco industry
"at all costs."302 Thus, the Forster court held that the objectives of
the federal act and the potential economic harm to the tobacco
industry should not preclude the right of smokers to seek legal
redress for their injuries. 313
The Appellate Court decision in Forster was the only current
judicial opinion on record that found that the federal act did not
preempt state tort, failure-to-warn claims. The Appellate Court's
findings and rationale in Forster were rejected, however, by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1989." The Minnesota Supreme
Court reasoned that failure-to-warn claims are necessarily based on
a cigarette manufacturer's duty to give a warning that is different
from the federal act's prescribed warnings, and thus such claims
conflict with one of the federal act's announced purposes: to pro-
hibit diverse, non-uniform warning requirements on cigarette pack-
2" Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 692, 700-01. The court stated that: "Where Congress has spoken on the subject
of preemption and not explicitly preempted the fundamental right to bring a state tort
action, we find it inappropriate and wholly unnecessary to strain to find implied preemption."
Id. at 693.
3°" Id. at 697 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, lnc.,
471 U.S. 707 (1985)). The Supreme Court in Hillsborough noted "that state and local regu-
ladon related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal regulations"
and that "the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and historically, a matter
of local concern." Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718, 719.
301 Forsi'r, 423 N.W.2d at 700-01.
" Id. at 696.
3U3 Id. at 700-01.
304 Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 57 U.S.L.W. 2604, 2604
(Minn. 1980).
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ages. 3"5
 The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Forster is sig-
nificant because it means that the American judicial system has now
unanimously accepted the preemption defense in failure-to-warn
litigation against cigarette manufacturers. This acceptance has, in
turn, allowed cigarette manufacturers to limit severely or bar prod-
uct liability suits that smokers and their families have brought dur-
ing the 1980s.
4. The Preemption Defense's Effect on Current Cigarette
Litigation
As the Minnesota Appellate court cautioned in Forster, cigarette
manufacturers have used the preemption defense to limit or bar
product liability suits. 3" In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. the Third
Circuit's directive allowing the preemption defense forced the Ci-
pollone district court to cut back the plaintiff's cause of action."' As
previously noted, the plaintiff in Cipollone was a smoker seeking
recovery from a cigarette manufacturer under theories of strict
liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and intentional tort. 308
 The
Cipollone district court, implementing the preemption defense as
directed, held that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn and breach of
express warranty claims were preempted. 30" Yet, the Cipollone court
subsequently allowed these claims to the extent that they pertained
to the cigarette manufacturer's pre-1966 conduct."'" The district
court further determined that intentionally misleading the public,
whether by misrepresentation or concealment of facts, constituted
"promotional" activity; hence, fraud claims were preempted from
1966 onwards.'" Nonetheless, the district court excepted from
"5 Id.
See id. at. 701.
9"3 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1986). The circuit
court refused to identify which claims were preempted by the Labeling Act. Rather, it merely
denied plaintiff's motion to strike the preemption defense and remanded the case back to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion concerning the preemp-
tive effect of the Act
3"3 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984).
3°9 Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 668, 675.
315 1d, at 668. The Cigarette Labeling and Advertisement Act took effect on January I,
1966. 15 U.S.C. § 1331.
9'I
	 649 F. Supp. at 673-74. Generally, fraud or intentional misrepresentation
consists of the following elements:
1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact;
2) knowledge of the falsity by the person making the misrepresentation;
3) intent that the misrepresentation be relied upon;
4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation;
5) resultant damage [to the plaintiff, proximately caused by such reliance].
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preemption any fraud claim charging that the defendants pre-
vented, or conspired to prevent, third persons from releasing in-
formation to the public on the health risks of smoking. 3 ' 2 Lastly,
the Cipollone court held that the federal act does not preempt any
strict liability or negligence claim that is independent of the defen-
dant's failure to warn. 3 "
The necessary product "defect" for a viable strict liability claim
may come from any of three sources, the district court in Cipollone
reasoned; a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, or an inadequate
warning."' The Cipollone court noted that each of these defects
creates an independent product liability claim, and only failure-to-
warn claims are preempted. In addition, the Cipollone court recog-
nized, a product is "defective," even absent a manufacturing or
design defect, if the product's inherent risks outweigh its social
utility."''' The Cipollone court noted that, although the product's
warning label is a factor in a product's risk/utility analysis, the
warning is not dispositive on the issue. 31 " Therefore, the Cipollone
court concluded, the federal act does not preempt a "non-defective"
product. liability claim" 17 based on a pure product risk/utility anal-
ysis. 3 ' 8
Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1499; see also W. PROSSER, UleiNtinook OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-
86 (4111 Ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER, LAW OF Tom],
A defendant's intentional failure to disclose significant facts may also constitute fraud
or misrepresentation if this failure-to-disclose meets the same criteria established for imposing
liability based on an affirmative misrepresentation. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp, at 1490; we also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550,
The district court determined that the plaintiffs' fraud or misrepresentation claims
sought to make defendant liable for intentionally misleading the public and/or depriving it
of the information necessary to make informed choices about the hazards of smoking.
Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 673. The court further reasoned that, because "the Court of Appeals
meant to exempt defendants from liability for what they did say, it follows that they cannot
be held liable for what they did not say." Id. The district court, compelled by the Third
Circuit's holding, allowed that a cigarette manufacturer has no civil liability for either mis-
stating or concealing the truth. Id. at 673-74.
" 2
 Id. at 674.
113 Id. at 669-72.
3 " Cipollone, 649 F. Stipp. at 669; see also, Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 856; Dewey v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco, 523 A,2d 712, 717 (N.J. Super. 1988), aff 'd as modified, 542 A.2d 919
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div, 1988). .
315 Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 669-72.
316 Id. at 670-71.
3 " An inherently dangerous product is a product whose associated risks outweigh its
social utility even absent a defect. Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 857
(D.N.H. 1988); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 523 A.2d 712, 717 (N.J. Super. 1986);
Cipollone v. Liggett. Group, Inc., 649 F. Stipp. 664, 669-71 (D.N.J. 1986).
31 ' Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 67 i ; see also Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 857; Dewey, 523 A.2d
at 717,
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The Cipollone court eventually concluded, however, that, al-
though New Jersey common law recognized that a plaintiff may
show that a product is unreasonably dangerous without proving a
product defect or a safer alternative design, such a cause of action
was now barred under present New Jersey 1aw."' 9 In this regard,
the Cipollone court held that the New Jersey legislature's recent
enactment of section 3(a)(2) of the New Jersey Products Liability
Act of 1987 320 barred "pure" risk/utility claims as a matter of law."'
The Cipollone court further held that section 3(a)(2) applied to any
pending product liability actions, and, as such, precluded the Ci-
pollones from asserting that cigarettes are an unreasonably danger-
ous product based on a risk/utility analysis. 322 The Cipollone court
did allow, however, that its holding only barred a cause of action
that was based on a cigarette's unsafe but known characteristics. 323
Thus, the Cipollone court did not preclude a cause of action that
claimed cigarettes were more dangerous than a reasonable con-
sumer expects because foreign, adulterating substances were pres-
ent in the defendant's cigarettes, or because a safer alternative
cigarette design was available"
Although the Cipollone court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
on their alternative design claim, it did not allow this issue to reach
3 '" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., slip op. No. 83-2864, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9936,
6 (D.N.J. October 27, 1987); see also, Gianitsis, 685 E. Stipp. at 859 (risk/utility analysis is not
recognized in New Hampshire); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Stipp. 1189,
1192 (D.C. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988) (cigarettes are not unreasonably
dangerous under Tennessee law).
'2" Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 197, 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (No. 6) 188793. Section
3(a)(2) of the act reads, in pertinent part:
In any product liability action against a manufacturer or seller for harm
allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective manner, the
manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if . . . the characteristics of the product
arc known to the ordinary consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an
unsafe aspect or the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product
and that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes
the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for
whom the product is intended.
Id.
The Cipollone court acknowledged that the parties agreed that section 3(a)(2) incorpo-
rated Restatement (Second) § 402A comment i into New Jersey law and, as such, would bar
the plaintiff's risk/utility claim if the section was applicable to pending litigation. Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 9936, 2 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12659, 10-11 (D.N.J. 1987).
321 Cipollone, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9936 at 2, 6.
32V Id.
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the jury.325 Instead, the district court directed a verdict for the
defendants on the Cipollone's design-defect claim because it held
that the plaintiffs failed to establish causation."'" The Cipollone court
determined that to sustain a design-defect claim the plaintiff must
prove that an alternative design more likely than not would have
prevented the plaintiff's injury. In this regard, the Cipollones pre-
sented expert testimony that a palladium cigarette could have been
marketed as early as 1971, and that such a cigarette design would
have reduced Mrs. Cipollone's risk of developing lung cancer by
between eight and seventeen percent."' Therefore, the Cipollones
argued, the cigarette manufacturer's failure to market the safer
palladium cigarette reduced Mrs. Cipollone's probability of avoiding
lung cancer, and thus increased her risk of injury." 8 The district
court noted, however, that, although the defendant's failure to mar-
ket an allegedly safer cigarette may have increased Mrs. Cipollone's
risk of injury, this so-called "lost chance" causation standard829 did
not extend to product liability claims."" Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the Cipollones must present evidence from which a jury
could reasonably find that a palladium cigarette would realistically,
or more likely than not, have prevented Mrs. Cipollone's lung can-
cer. 331 The Cipollone court held that an eight-to-seventeen percent
chance of avoiding lung cancer did not satisfy the plaintiff's "more
likely than not" burden of proof on proximate causation.
The Cipollone court further delineated the jury issues by hold-
ing that the Cipollone's strict liability claims subsumed their negli-
gence claims."' The court determined that to maintain both neg-
ligence and strict liability claims the Cipollones must show that the
defendant's failure to use "reasonable care" harmed them. in a
manner separate and apart from their strict liability claims. There-
323 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D.N.J. 1988).
326 Id.
327 Id. at 1493.
323 Id. The plaintiff argued that, under the "lost chance" doctrine, he must present
evidence that the defendants' conduct increased Mrs. Cipollone's risk of contracting lung
cancer and that this increased risk was a "substantial" factor in producing her injury and
death.
323 The "lost chance" doctrine is a theory of recovery that allows a plaintiff to recover
l'or injury suffered because the defendant's failure to act reduced the plaintiff's probability
of avoiding the injury actually sustained. See Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1494,
550 Id. In New Jersey the "lost chance" doctrine had only been applied in medical
malpractice actions. Id.
55, Id. at 1495.
592 hi. at 1499.
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fore, the Cipollone court also directed a verdict for the defendants
on the Cipollone's negligence claims because the plaintiffs had failed
to show that the defendant's action or inaction resulted in a more
dangerous product than one lacking a sufficient warning or a safer
design."3
Thus, the district court in Cipollone allowed the jury to consider
the Cipollones' failure-to-warn, breach of express warranty, and
fraud claims only to the extent that such claims challenged the
cigarette manufacturer's pre-1966 conduct. 3 " The district court also
allowed, without imposing any time period constraints, the Cipol-
lones' fraud claim that asserted that the tobacco industry prevented,
or conspired to prevent, third parties from releasing information
that smoking is dangerous. 3" This conspiracy claim, in particular,
may have troubled the tobacco industry because a finding of civil
conspiracy would have exposed each defendant, and perhaps the
entire cigarette industry, to joint and several liability for the dam-
ages caused by the acts and products of their co-conspirators. 336
The jury subsequently found that the defendants were not
liable for fraud or conspiracy, but were liable for failure to warn
and breach of express warranty. 33" The jury, however, apparently
not accepting a tobacco addiction argument, also found that Mrs.
Cipollone was eighty percent culpable in causing her own injury
and death. 338 The Cipollone court, however, upheld the jury's
$400,000 verdict in favor of Mr. Cipollone for his loss of consortium
based on the defendant's breach of express warranty. 3" In denying
Liggett's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict., the
district court emphasized that the plaintiff's express warranty claim
sounded in contract, not tort. 3.1 ° Thus, the Cipollone court held that
the jury's finding on Mrs. Cipollone's contributory fault barred
plaintiffs' recovery on their tort claim, but not on their contract
3" Id.
" 1 Id. at 1496-97,1500.
335 Id. at 1500.
"6 Id.; see also Eichenwald, supra note 10, at 114, col. 2.
337 See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying (ext.
338 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
35" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Stipp. 208,210,222-23 (D.N.J. 1988).
31" Id. at 210.
341 Id. at 215-17. The Cipollone court denied the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's
contributory fault barred her recovery for its breach of express warranty on both procedural
and substantive grounds. Id.
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In denying the defendant's j.n.o.v. motion, however, the Cipol-
lone court rejected two of the defendant's most potent arguments
on strictly procedural grounds, without considering the arguments'
legal merits. 3 'k 2 First, the defendant argued that under New Jersey's
interpretation of the UCC a personal injury action cannot be main-
tained by a buyer who is not in privity with the defendant-manu-
facturer.'''' Therefore, the defendant argued, the Cipollones' ex-
press warranty claim must fail because Mrs. Cipollone did not
purchase her cigarettes directly from Liggett. Although the Cipollone
court conceded that New Jersey's version of the UCC controlled
the warranty claim, it held that the defendant had not properly
raised the privity defense."'" Second, the defendant argued that the
jury's ending on Mrs. Cipollone's contributory fault barred any
recovery of consequential damages. The Cipollone court recognized
that. New Jersey's UCC bars the recovery of consequential damages
if the buyer's own fault or negligence contributes to the buyer's
injury. The district court concluded, however, that the defendant
had not properly raised this issue at trial, and thus refused to
consider the argument."'
The Cipollone court also refused the plaintiffs' motion for a
partial new trial limited strictly to the issue of damages."' Although
the district court agreed that the record clearly did not support the
jury's award of zero damages to Mrs. Cipollone, it denied the plain-
tiffs' motion for a new trial solely to determine the proper damage
award for Mrs. Cipollone's lifetime injuries.'" A buyer cannot col-
lect consequential damages, the district court noted, if the buyer
used the injury-causing product with knowledge of its warranty-
breaching defect. 3'tx Therefore, the Cipollone court determined that
3 '12 Id. at 212, 217-18. The Cipollone court denied the defendant's statute of limitation,
notice, "affirmation of fact," reliance, and proximate cause arguments on the merits or
because the jury findings were consistent with the evidence. Id. at 211-17. The only two
defendant arguments that the Cipollone court rejected strictly on procedural grounds, without
considering the legal merits, were the defendant's privity and consequential damages argu-
ments. Id. at 211-18.
Id. at 212.
344 Id.
"' Id. at 217-18.
"" Id. at 221.
5' 7 Id. at 210, 221. The Cipollone court noted that the parties had stipulated in the trial
that Mrs. Cipollone had incurred $124,500 in reasonable medical expenses. Additionally, the
district court recognized that plaintiff had incontrovertibly proved that Mrs. Cipollone had
suffered for many months prior to her death. The jury's award of zero damages to Mrs.
Cipollone clearly cannot reconciled with these proofs.
'48 Id. at 200.
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any trial concerning the proper amount of Mrs. Cipollone's conse-
quential damages must necessarily involve the issue of Mrs. Cipol-
lone's knowledge regarding the warranty-breaching defect in Lig-
gett's cigarettes. In sum, the Cipollone court denied both parties'
motions and entered judgment pursuant to the jury's verdict. 349
In another significant 1988 product liability case involving a
cigarette manufacturer, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held in Roysdon v. R. Reynolds Tobacco Co. that a
smoker-plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were barred under Ten-
nessee lawn" The plaintiff in Roysdon, Floyd Roysdon, began smok-
ing Camel cigarettes in 1946, switched to Winston cigarettes in the
1960s, and continues to smoke. 35 ' Mr. Roysdon alleged that his
cigarette smoking proximately caused him to develop severe pe-
ripheral vascular disease, which resulted in the 1983 amputation of
his left leg below the knee."' In his complaint Mr. Roysdon stated
two causes of action: that the defendant's cigarettes are defective
and unreasonably dangerous and that the warnings on cigarette
packages and advertisements were inadequate to apprise smokers
fully of cigarette smoking's serious health risks. Before trial, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
preempted the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim and dismissed it. At
the completion of trial, the Roysdon district court directed a verdict
for the defendant on the plaintiff's other product liability claim
because the trial court found that Roysclon had failed to establish a
jury question as to whether the defendant's cigarettes were unrea-
sonably dangerous.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed both of the Roysdon trial court's
findings. 353 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the federal act impliedly
preempts state tort claims for failure to warn. 354 Moreover, the
circuit court concluded that because Roysdon's product liability
claims were limited to harm allegedly caused within the ten year
period immediately preceding commencement of his suit (19'74-
1984), his failure-to-warn claims were completely barred. 355 The
549
 Id. at 222-23.
53" 623 F. Stipp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2t1 230,232 (6th Cir. 1955).
3" Id. at 232. The Sixth Circuit, itself noted in Roysdon that Mr. Roysdon had been
unable to stop smoking because of his tobacco addiction, despite his illness.
552 Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190.
"5 Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 236.
554 Id. at 235.
355 Id. at 232.
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Sixth Circuit also held in Roysdon that the defendant's cigarettes
were neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous. According to
Tennessee law, the circuit court noted, a manufacturer may be
found liable if its product is either defective or unreasonably clan-
gerous. 358 The Court of Appeals then defined a product defect as
a product condition that renders the product unsafe for normal or
foreseeable use and consumption. The Sixth Circuit noted that
Roysdon had not made any allegations or offered any proof that
the defendant's cigarettes were improperly manufactured or con-
tained dangerous impurities. Thus, the Sixth Circuit held the de-
fendant's, cigarettes were not defective because there was no evi-
dence that they posed greater health risks than those risks generally
associated with cigarette smoking." 57 The Roysdon court also held
that cigarettes are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law,
because they are not more dangerous than an ordinary consumer
would reasonably expect.
A similar rationale was employed by the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts in the 1988 case of Kotler v.
American Tobacco Co. to limit a plaintiff's breach of implied warranty
claim." 58 In Kotler the plaintiff, a widow, brought a product liability
action against a cigarette manufacturer alleging that smoking the
defendant's cigarettes proximately caused her deceased husband's
lung cancer and death. The plaintiff's complaint charged that the
defendants were liable for negligence, breach of warranty, negligent
misrepresentation, and fraud. 35" The defendant manufacturers
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting that
the federal act preempted all the plaintiff's claims. The Kotler court,
in allowing the defendants' motion in part and denying it in part,
held that the plaintiff's failure to warn, misrepresentation, and
fraud claims were only preempted as they pertained to the cigarette
manufacturers' post-1965 conduct." 1i° The Kotler court also held that
the plaintiff's breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
claim was not preempted, nor could it be dismissed because there
was an issue of material fact. 361
According to the Koller court a breach of implied warranty
claim, under Massachusetts law, is centered around reasonable con-
33" Id. at 235.
337
 Id. at 236.
53" 685 F. Sup)). 15 (D. Mass. 1988).
559 Id. at 16.
at Id. at 17-18.
16 ' Id. at 19-20.
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sumer expectations. 362 That is, the district court stated, merchant-
able goods must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which such
goods are used, and product fitness, in turn, is determined by
reasonable consumer expectations concerning product quality and
safety. The court held that reasonable consumer expectations con-
cerning a cigarette's safety is a material issue of fact because the
plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that the defendants' cigarettes were
inadequately tested and designed, and that they contained toxic and
carcinogenic ingredients. 363 The district court noted that other
courts have held that cigarettes may be found unmerchantable if
the tobacco contains pesticide residues, or if they contain excess
nicotine or additives that may affect their safety. Therefore, the
Kotler court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Thus, the state and federal courts' refusal to hold cigarettes
inherently dangerous and their unanimous acceptance of the
preemption defense has strengthened the tobacco industry's de
facto tort immunity. The courts do not permit smokers or their
survivors to challenge the tobacco industry's marketing activities or
the adequacy of their warning labels from 1966 to the present.
Moreover, the courts, to date, have completely barred plaintiffs, as
a matter of law, from arguing that non-defective cigarettes are
"unreasonably dangerous" based on a risk/utility analysis.
These rulings do not bar product liability or negligence suits
against a cigarette manufacturer, but they do combine to make such
suits virtually unwinnable. A product liability claim requires that a
plaintiff-consumer allege the presence of a product "defect" that
makes use or consumption of the product "unreasonably danger-
ous" to the consumer, and proximately causes his or her injury.3"4
A product "defect" may result from a manufacturing or design flaw,
or it may occur clue to an inadequate warning. 365 Also, a product
may be "unreasonably dangerous" without a defect if its risks out-
weigh its social utility. 366 The courts, however, have limited both the
application and availability of the risk/utility analysis. 3"7 They have
also severely limited any plaintiff claims based on a failure-to-warn
'02 Id. at 19.
3" 3 Id. at 20.
'61 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of plaintiff's prima
facie strict liability claim.
"55 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
"" See supra note 316 and accompanying text. See also notes 78-84 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the risk/utility analysis.
917
 See supra note 319-24 and accompanying text.
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defect. Smokers thus may bring a product: liability suit against a
cigarette manufacturer only if they allege a manufacturing or de-
sign flaw in the cigarette, or claim that the manufacturer failed to
adequately warn of cigarette smoking's health risks before 1966. 368
Smokers who cannot prove the presence of a foreign substance
in their cigarettes are, therefore, limited to pursuing a product
liability suit under either a design-defect claim or a pre-1966 failure-
to-warn claim. Although smokers might be successful on a pre-1966
failure-to-warn claim a jury might well conclude that the lengthy
period of continued smoking after 1965 is an intervening event
sufficient to break the requisite chain of causation.'"" Also, if a jury
is led to believe that the cigarette warnings have been adequate
since 1966, it is more likely to attribute a greater percentage of
culpability to the smoker for causing his or her own injury. Thus,
a smoker's chances to recover under a pre-1966 failure to warn
claim are greatly diminished, unless the smoker can impress the
jury with a tobacco addiction argument.""
A smoker may also bring a design defect claim, without any
time constraint, because the sufficiency of a product's warning is an
alternative, non-essential aspect of the requisite risk/utility in-
quiry."' Also, a warning is not dispositive on whether the product,
as designed, functions as safely as a reasonable consumer expects. 372
In jurisdictions that apply the consumer expectation test, a cigarette
is defectively designed only if the design makes a cigarette more
dangerous than an ordinary consumer would reasonably expect. 373
Some consumer expectation jurisdictions reason that, because an
ordinary consumer knows that cigarettes present a serious health
risk, they cannot be considered unreasonably dangerous beyond a
reasonable consumer's expectations unless they contain a manufac-
turing flaw. 374 Other such jurisdictions hold that whether a cigarette
sex
	 supra notes 306-63 and accompanying text.
"" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., (193 F. Supp. 208, 210 (13.N.j. 1988) (jury found
cigarette manufacturer strictly liable for failing to warn of cigarette's health hazards prior to
1966; yet, the jury also found smoker 80% culpable for causing her own smoking induced
illness, thus site was barred from tort recovery under New jersey law).
"" See supra notes 182-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tobacco
addiction argument.
371 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. (164, 671 (D.N.j. 1986).
"2 Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., (185 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (D. Mass. 1988); Dewey v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco, 542 A.2d 919, 925-26 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. 'Div. 1988). See supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consumer expectation test.
373 holler, 685 F. Supp. at 19-20; Dewo., 542 A.2d at 925-26.
374 Roysdon v. R.j. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 E Supp. 1189, 1191-92, (F.D. Tents,
1985), off'd. 849 17.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
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is defective is a jury question because cigarettes vary in design and
tobacco varies in composition."
Jurisdictions purporting to use the reasonable manufacturer
test apply a different rationale but reach basically the same result. 37"
Because cigarettes are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of
law, the plaintiff cannot challenge whether cigarettes are defective
because of tobacco's inherent characteristics."' Thus, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendants were capable of designing safer
cigarettes. 378 The risk/utility inquiry imputes knowledge to the man-
ufacturer of its product's defect as well as knowledge of other
possible design alternatives, then it determines whether the manu-
facturer, with this imputed knowledge, acted reasonably in market-
ing its product as clesigned. 379 The plaintiff in a jurisdiction apply-
ing the reasonable manufacturer test must, therefore, prove that
another cost effective design is available in order to prevail on his
or her claim.""
Additionally, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a design defect
claim must also prove that the defective design proximately caused
his or her injury. 38 ' To establish causation, a plaintiff must show
that an alternative design would more likely than not have pre-
vented injury. This means that to establish causation a plaintiff must
show that an alternative cigarette design would have reduced the
risk of contracting a smoking-induced illness by at least fifty-one
percent. If, however, a jurisdiction applies the "lost chance" doctrine
to product liability suits, then a plaintiff may prevail on causation
if he establishes that a manufacturer's failure to adopt a safer alter-
native design increased the risk of injury. 382 Thus, absent a manu-
facturing flaw, a smoker's defective design claim has little, if any,
chance for success.
Smokers may also pursue suits against cigarette manufacturers
under theories of negligence, breach of' warranty, and fraud, but
the probability for success on any of these theories is equal to or
575
 Keller, 985 F. Supp. at 19-20; Dewey, 542 A.2d at 925-26.
"6 Sec supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonable
manufacturer test.
977 See supra note 319-24 and accompanying text.
375 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D.N.J. 1988); Dewey, 542
A.2d at 925-26; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 664, 669 (D.N.j. 1986).
579 Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 669.
38° See supra notes 235-37, 319-24, 378 and accompanying text.
56 ' Cip011071e, 683 F. Supp. at 1495.
'52 Id. at 1494.
July 19891
	
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY 	 1159
less than that of a suit based on strict liability. Preemption bars the
smoker from challenging the tobacco industry's warning labels, or
its post-1965 marketing, advertising, and other promotional activi-
ties. Because the courts allow the preemption defense, plaintiffs
cannot challenge the cigarette manufacturer's post-1965 advertising
or promotion activity; thus, a plaintiff may not bring a claim for
breach of express warranty or fraud based on the industry's post-
1965 conduct.'" Claims based on pre-1966 conduct encounter the
same difficulties as failure-to-warn claims.'" Additionally, breach of
express warranty claims are even more difficult to maintain suc-
cessfully because of the various contractual defenses a cigarette
manufacturer may raise."' The Cipollone court created a narrow
exception to the preemption defense for fraud claims based on a
theory that the tobacco industry prevented or conspired to prevent
third persons from releasing information to the public on the health
risks of smoking."'" Despite the Cipollone court's recognition that
there was sufficient evidence to bring the question before the jury, 387
the Cipollone jury denied the plaintiffs' relief in their only attempt
to pursue this theory.'"
Although negligence suits remain viable, a plaintiff's strict lia-
bility claims may subsume such claims unless the plaintiff can show
that the cigarette manufacturer's negligent behavior created a de-
fective product that is more dangerous than one with a safer design
or an adequate warning. 389 If a court forces the plaintiff to choose
between these two theories, he or she will most likely choose to
pursue a strict liability claim. This outcome is likely because either
"3 See supra notes 309- 10 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
3A5
	 generally Cipollone, 693 F. Supp at 211-18 (an Overview of the various contractual
defenses available to cigarette manufacturers in defending a contractual breach of warranty
claim). Although the plaintiff in Cipollone was successful on a breach of express warranty
claim, the defendant was prevented from raising two contract defenses that may have effec-
tively barred such warranty claims on strictly procedural grounds. See supra notes 342-49
and accompanying text. See .supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
contract methods of recovery for product liability.
"' See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
3" Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1500; see Janson: supra note 6, at 134, col. 4. Janson notes
that the Cipollones introduced into evidence a 1972 confidential memorandum from Fredrick
R. Panzer, vice president of the Tobacco Institute, that outlined the cigarette industry's
"'brilliantly conceived and executed' 20-year strategy of countering assertions that smoking
produces cancer by 'creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it.'" Id.
3" Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 210.
989 See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
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cause of action requires proof of the same requisite elements and
both are subject to the preemption defense, but a negligence suit
requires that the plaintiff also prove the defendant's culpability. 390
Another option still open to plaintiffs, though few choose to
pursue it, is a cause of action based on a breach of implied war-
ranty."' Breach of implied warranty claims are not really viable
because reasonable consumer expectations regarding the safety of
cigarettes determine the scope of their implied warranty. 392 There-
fore, although the warning label on cigarettes cannot disclaim a
warranty of merchantability, 393
 the warning label's presence as well
as general public awareness of smoking's health risks lead to the
conclusion that cigarettes are not more dangerous than the reason-
able consumer expects. Thus, as the Massachusett's District Court
recognized in Koller v. American Tobacco Co., the plaintiff must still
prove the existence of a design defect or a foreign substance not
present in well-made cigarettes for a breach of implied warranty
claim to succeed:394
In summary, unless a smoker can prove that his or her ciga-
rettes contained a substance (i.e., pesticides, excess nicotine, etc.),
or a design defect not present in well-made cigarettes, the smoker
has virtually no chance of prevailing over a cigarette manufacturer
under any product liability theory. Thus, to maintain a viable prod-
uct liability suit, the plaintiff must show that the substance that
caused his or her injury is not inherent in good tobacco, or, alter-
natively, that a safer, cost-effective design probably would have
prevented his or her illness. Furthermore, the courts have stated
that any product liability claim challenging the tobacco industry's
warning labels, or the industry's advertising and marketing activity,
is preempted. A smoker may challenge the industry's pre-1966
conduct; the smoker must also convince the jury, however, that he
or she did not unreasonably assume the risk by continuing to smoke
after the warnings appeared. Thus, the tobacco industry enjoys
greater tort immunity than it did during the "first wave" of cigarette
litigation. Cigarette manufacturers no longer fear adverse jury ver-
"" Sec supra notes 49-56 and 112=15, and accompanying text for a discussion of the
difference between negligence and strict liability claims.
" j Sre Kotler r. Am. Tobacco, Co., 685 K Supp. 15,19 (1). Mass. 1988).
392 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
'95	§ 2-316 (1987). To disclaim a warranty of merchantability in writing, the
disclaimer must mention "merchantability." Id,
3"4 Kotler, 685 F. Supp. at 19-20.
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dicts because the courts preempt or bar most product liability claims
as a matter of law.. As the years progress and smokers age and die,
the number of pcitential plaintiffs who began smoking before 1966
dwindles and will eventually reach zero:39' At that time, the cigarette
industry will achieve absolute tort immunity, excepting the isolated
instance where a smoker is injured by a foreign object in his ciga-
rette.
II. THE FUTURE OF CIGARETTE LITIGATION
A. The Legitimacy of Preemption
The preemption of failure-to-warn claims is the most vital issue
in cigarette litigation because the preemption defense effectively
bars the only truly viable theory of recovery for smokers who have
been maimed or killed due to the cigarette industry's unscrupulous
marketing practices."' This judicial immunization from potential
595 See, e.g., Semowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-CV-118 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9102 (N.D,N,Y. 1958). In Seuunvich the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York dismissed a plaintiff's failure to warn and breach of warranty claims
against three cigarette manufacturers. Id. at 17. In Semowich the plaintiff brought. the snit to
recover for his deceased wife's lung cancer and death. Id, at 1. His wile. however, did not
begin smoking until 1970, therefore her failure to warn and express warranty claiins related
to post-1965 cigarette manufacturer conduct and were preempted, Id. at 1, 17.
3."i See supra notes 4. 247 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Federal Trade Com-
mission has charged that R.J. Reynolds illegally misrepresented and understated the health
risks of cigarette smoking by misrepresenting the purpose and results of a major government
study in its advertisements that ran From March to June 1985 in leading newspapers and
magazines. MeElvaine, supra note 6, at 182, 11.119 (citing N.Y. Times, Ju ne 17, 1986 at Al,
col. 2, Tobacco Industry Litigation Reporter, June 26, 1986 at 1000, 1047). During congres-
sional subcommittee hearings Charles Sharp, president of Charles Sharp and Associates, a
management consulting firm specializing in locating creative and management executives for
top advertising firms, concluded:
The (cigarette industry's] current advertising and promotion practices arc aimed
at expanding the market for their products, specifically through the targeting
or those populations among which there is the greatest potential for growth:
youth, women and minorities. The vast expenditures of the kigarettel industry
on their marketing efforts are carefully researched and crafted to ensure that
their messages about smoking — that is sexy, confidence inspiring, success
oriented, and fashionable — will appeal to and be most effective with those
audiences whose own needs and aspirations in life most readily conform with
the fulfillment exuding from the models used in these image advertisements.
Cleverly, subtly, and unfairly, current tobacco advertising and promotion prac-
tices exploit the dreams and desires or the most susceptible of us, our young
people, rur the purpose of hooking them on an expensive and deadly habit. As
any self-respecting advertising executive will admit, the art of selling a product
is not dependent on the actual need for a product. but on a perceived need for
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liability fails to provide any incentive for the tobacco industry to
design or market their dangerous products in a more conscientious
and responsible manner."' The reason that immunization fails to
a product. The tobacco industry has proved masterful at creating the misper-
ception among our nation's youth.
Tobacco Advertising Hearings, supra note 202 at 165 (Statement of Charles Sharp). Additionally,
Dr. Alan Blum, M.D., founder and chairman of "Doctors Ought to Care," related a conver-
sation with a former advertising agency employee who admitted the advertising agencies
were trying to influence 14-year old kids, because 14 was perceived to be the entry age for
smoking. Id. at 276 (statement of 1)r. Alan Blum). In this regard, it is believed that 85 to
90% of all new smokers begin smoking during their teenage years, and, of those that start
over 60% are addicted before they leave the ninth grade. Id. at 46 (statement of Charles A.
Lemaistre, M.D„ president of the American Cancer Society). And only 15% or the teenagers
who smoke even a single cigarette avoid becoming regular dependent smokers. Garner, supra
note 6, at 1434.
Moreover, cigarette advertising diverts a consumer's, or potential consumer's, attention
from the health consequences of smoking and seeks to assuage fear or anxieties concerning
smoking's health risks. Cigarette advertising attempts to counteract any health warning by
subtly using outdoor settings and vigorous, youthful, healthy people in cigarette advertise-
ments. The cigarette industry also attempts to alleviate a smoker's health anxieties by pro-
moting that their cigarettes are filtered and low in tar. See Tobacco Advertising Hearings, supra
note 202 at 130-36 (testimony of Edward T. Popper, DBA, associate professor, College of
Business Administration, Northeastern University); McLeod, supra note 2, at 1067. "Fur-
ther[more], there is a growing body of evidence that cigarette advertising revenues have a
chilling effect upon the willingness of recipients to speak about the dangers of smoking."
Tobacco Advertising Hearings, supra note 202, (opening statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
(chairman), presiding). The influence of the cigarette industry's advertising dollars has cre-
ated substantial economic leverage in the print media, such that the tobacco industry has
pressured the print media, including national weekly magazines, to self-censor their coverage
concerning cigarette smoking's serious adverse health risks. Warner, Special Report, Cigarette
Advertising and Media Coverage of Smoking and Health, 312 N.E. JRNL. MED. 384,384,388 (Feb.
7, 1985).
See generally Tobacco Advertising Hearings, supra note 202 at 486-580 (testimony of John
F. Banzhaf 111, professor of law, The National Law Center, George Washington University,
and Executive Director of Action on Smoking and Health); Federal Trade Commission, Staff
Report on the Cigarette Advertising Investigation, ch. 2, at 2, 8, ch. 5, at 31.
"7 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986). Judge
Sarokin eloquently summed up the state of cigarette litigation when the Third Circuit directed
him to allow the preemption defense:
In essence, no claim may be pursued which is predicated upon either the failure
to warn the consuming public of known dangers regarding the risk of smoking,
or upon the dissemination of' information about smoking through advertising
and promotion, even if calculated to deceive and mislead and to encourage
existing smokers to continue and non-smokers to begin. It is ironic that the
legislation which the tobacco industry sought so hard to def eat now serves to
substantially immunize it from liability; and that deceiving the consuming public
and concealing the truth from it is deemed to be an activity which Congress
impliedly intended to protect in enacting this legislation. In essence, without
any express authority from Congress, a single industry. for the first time in our
country's history, may speak what is untrue, may conceal what is true, and may
avoid liability for doing so merely by affixing certain mandated warnings to its
products and advertising.
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provide any incentive is because it allows the cigarette industry to
avoid liability merely by placing an inconspicuous and often innoc-
uous warning on a cigarette package while publicly contesting the
validity of these warnings, and knowingly devising marketing strat-
egies that are specifically intended to negate such warnings. There-
fore, the preemption defense must be eliminated in cigarette liti-
gation, or the tobacco industry will be allowed to market recklessly
a dangerous, addicting product that injures and kills hundreds of
thousands of Americans each year.
American courts considering the issue of preemption have
unanimously held that the Federal Cigarette and Labeling Act does
not expressly preempt state tort claims. The majority of these courts
also ruled that the federal act did not indicate a congressional intent
to "occupy the Field" of smoking and health so completely that it
superseded state tort law. Thus, a court may find state tort claims
preempted only to the extent that they "actually conflict" with fed-
eral law.
The courts favoring preemption have held that: state tort claims
challenging the cigarette industry's promotion and advertising prac-
tices, or the adequacy of its warning labels, are preempted, because
the "potential" regulatory effect of such claims conflicts with the
federal act's purpose. 398 Without examining the act's legislative his-
tory, these courts have determined that the act's policy provision,
read in conjunction with its preemption provision, reveal a clear
congressional intent to create a careful balance between protecting
the national economy and warning the public. This balance is
achieved, according to these courts, by mandating specific warnings
on cigarette labels and advertisements while barring state regulation
in these areas.
The courts favoring preemption have held that both state leg-
islative regulation and common-law damage awards must be
preempted to maintain the federal act's careful balance. Exposing
the cigarette industry to potential damage awards, these courts feel,
would, in effect, allow each jury to determine the cigarette industry's
warning and advertising standards. Thus, these courts have con-
cluded that cigarette manufacturers would be forced to comply with
a dizzying array of warning and advertising requirements in an
effort to avoid tort liability. To allow such a scenario would, accord-
ing to these courts, upset the delicate balance created by Congress,
"El See supra notes 280-88, 285-86 and accompanying text.
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expose the cigarette industry to non-uniform warning and adver-
tising requirements, and allow the states to do indirectly what they
are prohibited from doing directly.
Although superficially persuasive, this argument has several
shortcomings. A court should avoid finding preemption if the con-
flict between state and federal law is merely potentia1. 3 • Also, our
federalist system demands that federal law should not supersede a
state's police powers absent a clear congressional intent to do so.40°
A third shortcoming is the fact that Congress included a preemption
provision in the federal act that failed to expressly preempt state
tort claims."' Finally, a judicial preemption finding in this area
usurps the legislative function and effectively removes a critical issue
from the political process.
According to the Supreme Court, a federal law impliedly
preempts state law only if Congress has "occupied a field" so com-
pletely that it displaces state law in this area, or if a state law actually
conflicts with the federal law. 402 The courts that have considered
the issue agree that Congress has not "occupied the area of ciga-
rettes and health so completely that state tort claims must necessarily
be preempted."403 Thus, a court can find implied preemption only
if the federal act actually conflicts with failure-to-warn claims. An
actual conflict exists between state and federal law only if compliance
with both the state and federal law is a physical impossibility, or if
a state law operates to frustrate a federal act's purpose. 4°4
Any conflict between the federal act and state tort law for
failure to warn is strictly potential, not actual, for two reasons. First,
the regulatory effect is purely potential because a cigarette manu-
facturer may win a failure-to-warn suit. Therefore, there is only a
potential exposure to tort damages. In fact, if the warnings are
adequate, as the tobacco industry claims, the potential exposure is
zero. This argument finds support in the Galbraith case. In Galbraith,
"9 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Rice v.
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423
N.W.2cI 691, 697 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.
v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)).
1"° Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 695.
4" See supra notes 282 and 298 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. See also Fidelity Fed'I Say. & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Delta Cucata, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Pacific Gas Sc Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Cotnm'n, 461 U.S. 190. 204 (1982).
4" See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
4" Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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the plaintiffs reached the jury on a failure-to-warn claim that chal-
lenged the congressional warnings, and the jury found for the
defendant.
Additionally, an award of tort damages is not an injunction. 1 "5
A finding of liability for failure to warn does not, in itself, require
that the defendant change the inadequate warning, or dictate what
the new warning should be. Although a damage award may moti-
vate cigarette manufacturers to change their warnings or advertise-
ments, it does not mandate change: 1 m0 Thus, any industry changes
will be self-motivated, not state-imposed.
Moreover, our federalist system demands a strong presumption
against preemption. 907 Protecting the health and safety of citizens
is primarily and historically a state function,908 and allowing the
preemption of smokers' tort claims will leave a state's personal injury
victims without a legal remeciy. 409` Although these factors are not
dispositive on the preemption issue, the combination of them
strongly supports the Forster court's conclusion that the mere threat
of conflict between state and federal law is too speculative to support
a preemption finding in the area of health and safety, absent a clear
congressional intent to do so.'" 0
More importantly, Congress included a preemption provision
in the federal act that did not expressly preempt state tort claims.
Perhaps most indicative of the congressional intent not to preempt
state tort claims is the fact that in 1969 Congress amended the
federal act's preemption provision to include advertising but failed
to expressly preempt failure-to-warn claims.4 " Moreover, in 1984,
after the district court in Cipollone had ruled against preempfion, 412
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Stipp. 1146,1156 (D.N.j. 1984) (citing D.
Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423,
1454 (1980)).
.11 n !.
417 See supra note 206 and accompanying text,
4" Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 696.
'"' Id. at. 699-700.
41 " See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
' 11 Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6,84 Stat, H9 (1970). Congress amended the second paragraph
of the federal act's preemption to read "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of the
Act," Id. § 5(b), 84 Stat. 88. The 1969 Ad defined "State" to include "any political division
of any state." Id. § 3(3), 84 Stat. 88.
4P' Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1170-71. The Cipollone district court's opinion on the
nonapplicability of preemption in cigarette litigation was the only . judicial opinion on the
federal act's preemption status until December, 1085 when judge Hull issued his opinion in
favor of preemption in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
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Congress yet again amended the federal act but failed to express
any intention to preempt failure-to-warn claims. 4 's Surely, Congress
must be imputed with knowledge that its warnings were being chal-
lenged and that the Cipollone court had failed to preempt such
challenges.'" Congress knew how to prevent this "mischief" if it so
desired. Its failure to expressly preempt failure-to-warn claims
should give a court pause before attempting to divine such a
congressional intent.
The Third Circuit's attempt to divine such a congressional
intent in Cipollone merely by reading the federal act's policy provi-
sion in connection with its preemption provision is a judicial usur-
pation of legislative power and is clearly erroneous. By Finding
preemption when Congress failed to clearly express such an inten-
tion, these courts have effectively removed a controversial decision
from the political process; for our elected representatives in Con-
gress would have had to enact a controversial amendment to the
federal act if they wished to deny a personal injury victim his or
her right to legal redress:115 Now, however, because of the various
circuit court opinions on preemption, Congress must enact a savings
clause to preserve a citizen's right to legal redress when Congress
never expressly denied this right in the first place. 41 t" Moreover,
courts should not strain to find federal preemption of state law
4 " Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 State. 2200 (1984) (codified at various sections of Title 15).
Congress enacted more specific and stringent cigarette labeling requirements to be promi-
nently displayed on cigarette packages on a rotational basis. Id. § 4, 98 Stat. 2201-03.
Congress' 1984 Act left intact the 1969 Act's policy and preemption provisions.
4 " See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1161-62; Palmer v. Liggett Croup, Inc., 633 F. Supp.
1171, 1176 (I). Mass. 1986).
415 See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 700-01 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988). The Forsler court noted that state tort remedies should not be withdrawn from citizens
without an express statement from Congress or a clear and unequivocal finding of implied
preemption. Id.; .see also Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1180 (the decision to effectively immunize
the tobacco industry from tort claims must conic from Congress not the courts); Cipollone,
593 E Supp. at 1148 (before a court rejects fundamental common law principle "it should
demand a much more definitive statement from Congress").
4 '" Recently Congress enacted The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30. In the Smokeless Tobacco Act, Congress
included a "savings clause" that read as follows:
"Nothing in this Act. shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State
statutory law to any other person." Id. § 7(c), 100 Stat. 34 (1986).
The Smokeless Tobacco Act and the Cigarette Labeling Act are nearly identical. Ewell,
supra note 20, at 889. As the Palmer district court noted, Congress' inclusion of a savings
clause in the 1986 Smokeless Tobacco Act, occurring as it did during the Cipollone and
Roysdon preemption controversy, reinforces the idea that Congress does not believe that
allowing failure-to-warn suits will frustrate its objective of uniform warnings. Palmer, 633 F.
Supp. at 1179.
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unless a congressional intent to preempt such law is clearly present.
Yet, the Third Circuit concluded that the federal act preempted
failure-to-warn claims without examining the act's legislative history
or resorting to other statutory construction techniques, despite the
fact that it held that the federal act did not expressly preempt state
tort claims.
Congress failed or chose not to preempt state tort claims in the
clear language of their preemption provision.417 This provision
should be given meaning from its plain language, not from reading
it in conjunction with the act's policy provision. 418 If, however, a
court believes the federal act's language is not explicit, then it must
employ other statutory construction techniques to ascertain the fed-
eral act's intent:nu In this regard, it is important to note that Con-
gress enacted the federal statute in 1965 in response to the 1964
Surgeon General's report on the serious health risks associated with
smoking. 42° The federal act was a congressional compromise de-
signed to prevent the prohibition of cigarettes by warning the public
of the health risks without over-burdening the tobacco industry with
diverse marketing regulations. 42 ' The mischief to be remedied, how-
ever, was the elimination of various state and local laws regulating
the sale of cigarettes, not the elimination of state tort claims. 422
Failure-to-warn claims against cigarette manufacturers had been
prevalent since the late 1950s. If Congress wished to preclude such
claims, then it should have expressly done so. The congressional
intent not to disturb the viability of these claims is further evidenced
by the reassurances given by the federal act's supporters during
congressional debate. As the Cipollone district court noted, the only
court to examine fully the act's legislative history, the federal act's
supporters clearly stated that the federal act would not adversely
affect the rights of injured parties to seek legal redress against
cigarette manu factu rers. 423
Congress expressly mandated that state law could not require
cigarette manufacturers to include any additional warnings. 424 The
917 Id., 633 F. Supp. at 1174; 15 U.S.C. 1334.
418
 Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 699.
4191d.
42°
 Ewell, supra note 20, at 878; Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1173,
42 ' Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 699; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1189, 1191
(D.N.J. 1984).
422 Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 699.
4" Id.; see Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1162-63.
424 15 U.S.C. § 1334.
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federal act, however, did not state that cigarette manufacturers were
forbidden from including additional warnings that were strictly self-
motivated and self-imposed. 425
 Exposing the tobacco industry to
tort liability is, at best, a potential conflict between federal and state
law. Furthermore, damage awards do not impose additional warn-
ing or advertising requirements as a matter of law; such awards
merely motivate self-imposed requirements. Thus, courts allowing
state tort claims still allow a cigarette manufacturer to comply with
the federal act without frustrating the federal act's congressional
purpose; hence, a finding of preemption is unwarranted.
In fact, allowing failure-to-warn claims is consistent with the
federal act's declared congressional policy and prior judicial prec-
edent. The federal act's declared dual policy was to inform the
public about cigarette smoking's health hazards and to prevent the
cigarette industry from exposure to diverse, state-imposed warning
and advertising requirements. 42" Allowing failure-to-warn claims
would not conflict with either congressional purpose, and would, in
effect, promote what surely must have been Congress' major con-
cern in enacting the federal act: to inform the consuming public
adequately of cigarette smoking's serious health risks.
Allowing failure-to-warn claims would not expose cigarette
manufacturers to diverse warning and advertising requirements
because such requirements would be strictly self-motivated and self-
imposed. A cigarette manufacturer would be free to adopt any
additional warnings that it considered necessary, in addition to Con-
gress' prescribed warnings, and uniformly include such warnings on
its tobacco products. It is safe to assume that a cigarette manufac-
turer, acting in its own self-interest, would. voluntarily adopt the
most stringent warning in an effort to avoid liability for failure to
warn adequately. A stringent warning label, and conscientious mar-
keting practices, would protect a cigarette manufacturer from po-
tential product liability while better informing smokers and poten-
tial smokers of cigarette smoking's grave health risks. Thus, allowing
failure-to-warn claims against cigarette manufacturers would ensure
that the public is adequately informed about cigarette smoking's
42.' Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1170-71; Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171,
1177 (1). Mass. 1986).
426 See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 11M. But see Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1166. The Cipollone
district court recognized the federal act's two purposes as, first, to preserve the economic
vitality of the tobacco industry and the individual's freedom to choose to smoke, and, second,
to implement this goal by mandating uniform labeling and advertising requirements.
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serious health risks, without exposing cigarette manufacturers to
diverse state regulations or warning requirements.
Additionally, allowing failure-to-warn claims in cigarette liti-
gation is consistent with prior judicial precedent. Many courts have
held that a manufacturer's compliance with federal labeling/warn-
ing requirements or safety standards does not preempt a plaintiff's
product liability claim. 427 These courts recognized that such federal
requirements are only the minimum safety standards with which a
manufacturer must comply, not maximum standards that the man-
ufacturer may not exceed.'128 Therefore, despite the fact that Con-
gress, in this instance, has prescribed the warnings' exact lan-
guage,429 a jury should be allowed to decide if the congressionally
427 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. See also Silkood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238, 256-58 (1984) (compliance with Price-Anderson Act, which comprehensively
regulates the nuclear power industry, did not preempt state tort claims or punitive damage
awards); Ferebee v. Chevron Chain. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(compliance with Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and EPA regulations
does not preempt failure to warn claims); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950. 958 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (compliance with National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act does not relieve car manufacturer of liability for defective design);
MacDonald v, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 140, 475 N.E.2d 115, 70 (1985);
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Ca1.3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal, Rptr. 45, 53
(1973) (compliance with FDA warning requirement does not immunize a drug manullteturer
from failure w warn claims); Maize v. Atlantic Relining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 56, 41 A.2d 850,
853 (1945) (label approved by Surgeon General is not adequate as a matter of law), See
generally REsTATENIENT (SECOND) OF 'PORTS § 288c (1965) (generally compliance with a legis-
lative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence
where a reasonable person would take additional precautions).
.1211 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); see also supra note 197 and
accompanying text.
429 See supra note 285 and accompanying text. The First Circuit in Palmer felt that the
congressional mandate of the cigarette warning's exact language and the fact that the federal
act applied only to cigarettes and prohibited any state regulation in the area of cigarette
warnings combined to distinguish the Palmer case from Ferebee. See Palmer v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 628-29 11.13 (1st Cir. 1987). Additionally, the Third Circuit in Cipollone
concluded that the cigarette warnings' exact language was necessary to maintain the careful
balance between informing the public and protecting the economy that Congress had sought
to create. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. What both these circuit courts billed to
realize, however, was that a state tort verdict does not command a cigarette manufacturer to
change its label — the verdict merely tells the manufacturer that if it chooses to continue to
sell its cigarettes within the state it may have to compensate consumers that it injures. See
Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541. Moreover, legal minimums are not intended to supplant moral
maximums. It is conceivable that cigarette manufacturers that have been directed to do no
less can safely assume that they need not do more. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 1146, 1170 (D.N.J. 1984). Alternatively, Congress may have determined exactly how
much information the public should have in deciding whether to smoke and may have
effectively prohibited the tobacco industry from freely adding any additional'information on
smoking's harmful effects. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1178. If we agree with the circuit courts
that preemption is warranted, then "we must conclude that Congress legislated to curtail the
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mandated warnings adequately inform smokers of a cigarette's in-
herent health risks."'" The failure to allow a jury to decide the legal
sufficiency of the warnings necessarily imputes that Congress in-
tended to establish these exact warnings as the maximum disclosure
required by law and to limit the information available to a potential
smoker when he or she makes the decision to start or to continue
smoking. Although Congress did express an intention in the federal
act to protect the national economy, it is doubtful that it intended
to sacrifice under-informed consumers for the good of the gross
national product.
Thus, the preemption defense muse be overruled in cigarette
litigation so that the tobacco industry may have a financial incentive
to\ market its products forthrightly. Truthful marketing practices
would, in turn, allow a smoker to make an informed decision on
whether to start or continue smoking, while imposing only a mini-
mal burden on the industry. 43 ' Moreover, because of the tobacco
industry's tremendous financial and political power, 432 state tort
claims may be the only viable alternative for effectively regulating
the industry's marketing of a dangerous and addicting product.
The last section of this note analyzes the possible regulatory effects
that failure-to-warn claims might have on the cigarette industry.
B. The Possible Effects of Permitting Failure-to-Warn Claims
Overruling the preemption defense would only affect the prod-
uct liability of cigarette manufacturers for failure-to-warn, breach
of express warranty, and fraud claims. The tobacco industry's ex-
posure to tort liability under the remaining theories of product
liability (i.e., negligence, defective design, breach of implied war-
ranty, etc.) would remain unchanged. Yet, this result would be
significant because it would allow consumers to assail the cigarette
industry's marketing practices rather than their product.
potential flow of information lest the public learn too much about the hazards of smoking
for the good of the economy. We are loathe to impute such a purpose to Congress absent a
clear expression." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969).
490
 See Palmer. 633 F. Supp. at 1178. See also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
"' Milio, Health and Policy and the Emerging Tobacco Reality, 21 Soc. Sct. Mtn. 603, 607
(1985) Milio estimates that the cost to the tobacco industry of complying with the rotational
warning system is 0.0004 cents per pack of cigarettes.
492 See Garner, supra note 6, at 1463; Ross, supra note 4, at 326, 329, 332; Thornton,
supra note 266, at 572.
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The current state of failure-to-warn product liability law would,
in turn, provide smokers with the necessary precedents to challenge
successfully the marketing strategy of the tobacco industry, and the
adequacy of the congressionally prescribed warnings on cigarettes.
For activity prior to 1966, smoker-plaintiffs' claims and evidence
remain unchanged; despite the availability of scientific research on
smoking-induced illness, the tobacco industry failed to provide a
timely warning to smokers of the potential danger. After 1966, the
plaintiffs would argue that the warnings Congress mandated were
inadequate in both form and substance to apprise smokers fully of
the risks associated with cigarette smoking. The victims may further
argue that the advertising and promotional campaigns of the ciga-
rette companies have been carefully designed to downplay their
warnings and to deny the health risks of smoking in an attempt to
confuse consumers and provide rationalizations for people to start
smoking or to continue to do so despite the risk. 4" Because other
manufacturers, especially drug manufacturers, have been found
liable for failure to provide comprehensive, detailed warnings,
plaintiffs will have a good chance of recovering against the tobacco
companies."' This probability of success will increase as society's
attitude toward smoking continues to change, and the evidence on
smoking's health risks and addictive nature increases.
Because a product warning serves two purposes, a jury may
impose liability on a manufacturer for failure-to-warn for a warning
that fails to satisfy either purpose." 5 A warning should alert any
product user to any potential product danger so that the user may
reduce his or her risk of injury when using the product. 436 Also,
"3 See supra note 430 and accompanying text, Although the tobacco industry claims that
its advertising is defensive in nature and designed to promote brand loyalty and to encourage
brand switching, and not to induce consumers to begin smoking, studies of the industry's
advertising strategies by the Federal Trade Commission have indicated otherwise. Milio,
supra note 431, at 610. See also, Tobacco Advertising Hearings, supra note 202, at 45-48 (testi-
mony of Charles A. Lemaistre, M.D., president of the American Cancer Society). Dr. Le-
maistre noted that only 10% of current smokers switch brands each year, while nearly 1.4
million smokers die or quit each year. Id. at 45. It is unreasonable to believe that the tobacco
industry is not making every effort to replace those smokers that die or quit, in order to
maintain its market. Id. See also id. at 128-30 (testimony of Edward T. Popper, DBA, associate
professor, College of Business Administration, Northeastern University) (cigarette industry's
argument that its advertising campaigns are designed to promote brand loyalty and encour-
age brand switching cannot survive economic analysis).
"4 See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the warning
requirements that have been imposed on insecticide and drug manufacturers.
433 See. supra note 92 and accompanying text.
4" See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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the warning should convey enough detailed information concerning
the scope and gravity of a product's inherent danger so that poten-
tial users may make an informed decision whether to use the prod-
uct, and thus expose themselves to the attendant danger. 437 As
medical research has determined that there is no safe level of cig-
arette consumption, 438
 the first rationale fails to justify the provision
of a warning in a cigarette smoking context. The fact that there is
no safe level of cigarette consumption means that it is impossible
for a cigarette manufacturer to provide a warning that will decrease
a smoker's risk of injury if he or she chooses to smoke. The second
rationale for requiring a warning, however, establishes a cigarette
manufacturer's duty to warn. Thus, a cigarette manufacturer has a
duty to provide a comprehensive warning that details all the health
risks associated with smoking. This warning should prominently
display all the information an ordinary consumer would reasonably
require concerning the potential and severity of smoking-induced
illness so that the consumer may make an adequately informed
decision whether to begin smoking, or if he or she has begun,
whether to continue. 439
The issue in cigarette litigation is not, as the cigarette industry
maintains, freedom of choice, 44° but, rather, whether a smoker's
personal decision to smoke is an adequately informed one. In this
regard, the government should not have to provide or disseminate
the information on cigarette smoking's health risks."' Moreover,
the duty to warn is non-delegable; thus, the tobacco industry should
not be allowed to attribute the warnings to the Surgeon Genera1, 442
"7 See supra notes 94, 212-14 and accompanying text.
"8 TonAcco ADVERTISING HEARINGS, supra note 202, at 91 (testimony of Dr. R. Davis,
Member, Board of Trustees of the AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION); see also 1979 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, preface at XII.
"5 See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of "inherently dan-
gerous" products. See also Buret, 493 F.2d at 1089. The Borel court noted that when dealing
with "unavoidably unsafe" products (the category cigarettes must now fall in by analogy):
the rule is that the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to
whether the product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of
harm. Thus, a true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever
a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide
whether to expose himself to it.
Id.; see also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 138-39, 475 N.E.2d
65, 69-70 (1985); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276-78 (5th Cir. 1974);
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 129-31 (9th Cir. 1968).
"" See Eichenwald, supra note 1(}, at 114, col. 4.
"' See supra notes 180, 195-96, and accompanying text; see also Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973).
"2 See supra note 285 and accompanying text. The current rotational warnings and the
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or to dispute these warnings or cigarette smoking's health risks
publicly through their advertising and promotional campaigns. 44 '
Neither should the cigarette industry's advertisements or promo-
tional campaigns be allowed to downplay, subtly or otherwise, the
seriousness of cigarette smoking's health risks or to impair the
warnings' effectiveness."4
The potential exposure to tort liability, including punitive dam-
ages, for failure to warn adequately would provide the necessary
incentive for the tobacco industry to market its products more
responsibly, without the need for continuous regulatory legislation.
The tobacco industry would be forced to self-regulate its marketing
practices because a jury could reasonably find that the congression-
ally prescribed warnings on cigarette packages are insufficient in
both form and substance to inform a smoker adequately of cigarette
smoking's inherent health risks. The earlier warnings on cigarette
packages and advertisements merely stated: "Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." This warning was
strengthened in 1970 to: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health."
These warnings are general and vague, and lack the necessary
specificity and force to convey cigarette smoking's attendant risks
adequately so that the ordinary smoker could make an informed
choice on whether he or she should smoke. 445 Even the more de-
tailed rotational warnings that took effect in October 1985 might
reasonably be considered too vague and general to inform smokers
adequately of their potential for contracting smoking-induced ill-
nesses, or to evoke the requisite sense of urgency that such serious
health risks demand..""
1970 warning on cigarette packages and advertisements arc attributable to the Surgeon
General.
:143 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also Gidmark, supra note 8, at 21. Gidmark
notes that it was RJ. Reynolds' position during the Galbraith trial that cigarettes have never
been scientifically proven to be harmful. This has been the industry's consistent legal position.
Id.
114 See supra notes 202-03,230-34,433 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra notes 203-29,439 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra note 285 for the exact wording of the four rotational warnings now required
on cigarette packages and advertisements.
See also McLeod, supra note 2, at 1065. McLeod notes that even Congress' most stringent
warning fails to inform a smoker or potential smoker adequately that:
smoking nearly doubles one's risk of heart disease, that smokers are between
ten and iwenty-five times more susceptible to lung cancer than are non-smokers,
and that between seventy and eighty percent of all emphysema and chronic
bronchitis deaths are attributable to smoking . • . [nor do the current warnings]
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Moreover, the cigarette warning labels have never mentioned
the danger of tobacco addiction or death, although both these fac-
tors are critical in making an informed decision whether to smoke.
The medical evidence linking cigarette smoking with death has been
available since the 1930s, 4" and the fact that tobacco is addictive
has been suspected for quite some time. 448 Despite this evidence,
the tobacco industry has successfully lobbied Congress to make
certain that neither addiction nor death is mentioned on cigarette
packages or advertisements.449
The threat of civil liability, however, might accomplish what
Congress has failed to do. Faced with a staggering amount of po-
tential liability,45° the cigarette industry will have to give up the
charade of the so-called smoking-health controversy and admit the
inform an individual that his or her risk of premature death from cigarette-
induced illness inc. -eases up to forty-five percent if he or she smokes.
Id.
McLeod also notes that the current warning, "WARNING; Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Fremature Birth, and Low Birth Weight," does not evoke the
same urgency as realizing that smoking increases by up to 35% the risks of spontaneous
abortion, fetal death, or neonatal death. Id.
In this regard the Federal Trade Commission has noted that;
Over 50% of adult Americans do not know that cigarette smoking is addictive.
*Approximately 40% of high school seniors do not believe there is a great health risk in
smoking.
*Almost 50% of all women do not know that smoking during pregnancy increases the risk
of stillbirth and miscarriage.
*Almost 60% of the public does not know that smoking causes most cases of emphysema
and bronchitis.
*Over 30% of the public does not know that smoking causes heart disease; and over 50% do
not know that smoking causes many cases of heart disease.
*Approximately 20% of the public does not know that smoking causes lung cancer; over
40% do not know that smoking causes up to 90% of the lung cancer cases.
*A lower percentage of heavy smokers (76%) are aware that smoking is hazardous to your
health as compared to the general American public (90%).
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION
(1981).
"7 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-6.
" 0 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. King James 1 suspected that tobacco was
addicting as early as 1604. See E.F. BORGATTA, R.R. EVANS, SMOKING, HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR
4 (Aldine Publishing Co. 1970); McElvaine, supra note 6, at 168 n.13; see also Garner, supra
note 6, at 1499-45. Garner notes that the 1964 Surgeon General's Report lists thirty-six
reports dealing with nicotine addiction, of which the earliest report was published in 1895;
see also Seley v. G.D. Searle, 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981) (the
existence of a product risk does not have to be definitely established before a manufacturer
incurs a duty to warn of such a risk).
"9 See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
"° See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); Palmer v. Liggett GrOup, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1180 (D. Mass. 1986); See also
McElvaine, supra note 6, at 165-66, n.2-3; Garner, supra note 6, at 1463 n.261,
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causal link between smoking and ill health. Additionally, to avoid
liability the cigarette industry would be forced to voluntarily adopt
more stringent warning labels detailing cigarette smoking's various
health risks. Such warnings would have to exhibit sufficient urgency
to compel the attention of smokers, or potential smokers, and affect
their decision to smoke. 451 These results should occur because, as
the MacDonald court pointed out, it is a well-established legal prin-
ciple that a warning is inadequate if it is "reluctant in tone" or fails
to make the extent and severity of a product's risks reasonably
comprehensible to the ordinary consumer. 452
Furthermore, because it is reasonably foreseeable that illiterate
or non-English speaking consumers will smoke, the cigarette indus-
try may have to adopt appropriate symbols to warn of the danger. 453
Thus, it may be necessary for the tobacco industry to include a
prominent skull-and-crossbones symbol to adequately warn of cig-
arette smoking's inherent danger. 454 Moreover, the cigarette indus-
try would be forced to police itself because it is another well-estab-
lished legal rule that a jury may infer that a warning is inadequate
if a manufacturer knows that its warning is widely disregarded and
fails to change it. Thus, exposing the cigarette industry to civil
liability for failure to warn may cause the industry to increase and
monitor the effectiveness of its warning labels.
In this same manner, the threat of potential civil liability should
effectively regulate the cigarette industry's advertising and promo-
tional practices without requiring additional congressional interven-
tion. 455 This self-imposed regulation would occur because a jury
could also impose liability on the cigarette industry if it finds that
the industry's advertising and promotional practices effectively
watered-down the impact of its warnings. 456 Furthermore, a jury
could find that the cigarette industry's adamant refusal to accept
and publicize the causal link between smoking and serious illness, 457
5 L See supra notes 204-29, 446 and accompanying text.
4" MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 141, 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-
72 (1985); Seley, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 423 N.E.2d at 837. The Seley court noted that "a
reasonable warning not only conveys a fair indication of the nature of the danger involved,
but also warns with the degree of intensity demanded by the nature of the risk." Seley, 67
Ohii) St. 2d at 198, 423 N.E.2d at 837.
4" See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
455 See generally Tobacco Advertising Hearings, supra note 202, at 1-7. The House Subcom-
mittee was studying proposals to completely ban cigarette advertising or, alternatively, to
make such advertising costs non-deductible for federal tax purposes.
456 See supra notes 202-03, 230-34, 433 and accompanying text.
457 See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
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combined with its advertising techniques to assuage a smoker's
health anxieties, 4" may effectively render cigarettes more danger-
ous than an ordinary consumer reasonably expects. 459
Such a jury finding would also serve to negate an assumption-
of-the-risk defense,46° because a smoker's continued smoking is not
unreasonable if' the smoker was not adequately informed of the
inherent danger, or if the manufacturer's promotional activity mi-
sled consumers, or otherwise caused consumers to underestimate
the risks they were taking. Alternatively, the ability to establish
tobacco addiction conclusively would present a cause of action that
would render the assumption-of-the-risk defense ineffective."' This
claim would be viable because a smoker could show that the tobacco
industry has never warned the smoker of tobacco addiction, and
that this failure to warn has caused the smoker's subsequent addic-
tion which, in turn, has rendered the smoker's continued smoking
involuntary. 462 Thus, allowing failure-to-warn claims against the cig-
arette industry would present smokers with several possible alter-
natives for holding the tobacco industry accountable for its ques-
tionable marketing practices.
Additionally, the policy reasons for strict product liability sup-
port an imposition of such liability on the cigarette industry, re-
gardless of its warnings:16' Economically it is more rational and
equitable for the tobacco industry to bear directly the costs that
tobacco products inflict on society. The policy underlying strict
product liability is to force a manufacturer to bear the cost of
product-related injuries when it markets dangerous products, and/
or products of questionable social value. This policy contains two
beneficial effects: it rids the market place of unsafe products (with-
out legislating them out of existence), and it apportions the cost
among a product's consumers without forcing society to subsidize
the use of dangerous products. 464 In this regard, between a maim-
_
"8 See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the assumption-of-
the risk defense.
481 See supra notes 182-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tobacco addic-
tion argument.
4"9 See supra notes 960-61 and accompanying text.
485 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also, Henderson, Coping With the Time
Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919.931-39 (1981). Henderson notes that
products liability has four major policy objectives: encouraging investment in product safety,
discouraging consumption of dangerous products, reducing transaction costs, and promoting
loss-risk spreading. Id. at 931-32.
413 Id. at 933. Henderson notes that strict liability discourages the use of dangerous
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facturer and a consumer, the manufacturer is in the better position
to evaluate its product's risks, and to insure against them. The
insurance cost may be then internalized and passed on to the con-
sumer in the form of higher product prices. Therefore, allowing
the tobacco industry to prosper economically while forcing society
to pay for the damage its products cause does not make economic
sense. It provides no incentive whatsoever for the tobacco industry
to market a safer product.
Imposing damage awards on the tobacco companies would
force the industry to internalize these costs, and pass them on to
smokers through a price increase on cigarettes. This would put the
cost of the injuries on the proper parties — smokers — and possibly
lead to a decrease in consumption as the price began to rise. More
importantly, it could cause the price of cigarettes to rise to a level
that would be prohibitive to young people. This price-hike, in turn,
might reduce the number of new smokers. 465 Alternatively, it might
force young people to put off the decision to smoke until they are
more mature, and more able to make such an important decision." 66
Imposing such strict liability on the tobacco industry may ruin the
industry." 7 Yet, it would serve to distribute the costs equitably and
allow market forces to function properly.
Such an imposition of strict liability, however, would make the
cigarette industry "absolute insurers" of tobacco products.'" That
is, the tobacco industry would be forced to pay damages whenever
a tobacco product caused an injury, regardless of fault. For this
reason the courts have been loathe to impose such liability on the
products by increasing their cost., which places them at a disadvantage with other products
in the market place. One of the rationales for such a policy is that consumers tend to
underassess product risks alld are thus reminded of these risks by the high price. Id.
4°5 See Ross, supra note 4, at 337. Ross Wiles that price increases on tobacco products
affect the consumer's demand for these products. Id. The price effect on demand is a function
of the age or the consumer, the consumer's income, and the elasticity of the consumer's
demand. Id. The group of smoker's most responsive to a price increase arc the younger
smokers. Id. He further estimates that a sixteen percent increase in the price of cigarettes
would cause 3.5 million smokers either to quit or not to start smoking. Id. (citing Warner,
Smoking and Health Implications of a Change in the Federal Cigarette Excise Tax, 255 J.A.M.A.
1028, 1029-31 (1986)). Currently the cost of cigarettes is approximately $1.50/pack. If the
imposition of strict liability caused the price to rise to $4.50-6.00 this would be a 200-300%
increase in price. The reduction in consumption should, therefore, be substantial. This is
especially true considering that the tobacco industry has targeted predominantly lower in-
come groups, such as youth, women and minorities for the expansion of their market.
"1 "' See supra notes 433, 465 and accompanying text.
467 See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
1 "8 See supra notes 140-54, 170 and accompanying text for discussions of absolute liability.
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tobacco industry. 469 Allowing failure-to-warn claims, however,
would not impose liability without fault. Failure-to-warn claims im-
pugn the integrity of a manufacturer's marketing process, not the
integrity of its product. Thus, allowing failure-to-warn claims would
not impugn a cigarette's inherent safety, but it would hold the
tobacco industry accountable for marketing its products in a re-
sponsible manner.
III. Conclusion
The judicial finding of preemption in cigarette litigation has
led to de facto tort immunity for the cigarette industry. Such a
judicial finding, without a clearly expressed congressional intent to
preempt state tort law, is an unwarranted judicial overreaching.
Moreover, a preemption finding frustrates the congressional policy
that the public is to be informed adequately of cigarette smoking's
health risks. Congress, in allowing the cigarette industry to continue
marketing an extremely dangerous product, could not possibly have
intended that this marketing be done irresponsibly, and the courts
are wrong to impute such an intent. If Congress allows cigarette
manufacturers to market such a dangerous product without impos-
ing absolute liability on the manufacturer for product-related in-
juries, then surely it expects that these manufacturers will market
their products in a responsible fashion. Failure-to-warn claims are
the only adequate civil remedy to ensure that the cigarette industry
markets its products in a reasonably responsible manner. Thus,
courts must overrule the the preemption defense, and allow plain-
tiffs to challenge the integrity of the tobacco industry's marketing
processes.
PETER F. RILEY
"9 See supra notes 367, 468 and accompanying text.
